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Institutional Investors, Financial Sector Development and Economic Growth 
 
This academic exercise studies the role of institutional investors (pension 
fund, insurance companies and investment companies) in the development of the 
financial sector and economic growth in OECD countries by employing a dynamic 
panel VAR. While pervious studies in this area have mainly focused on contractual 
savings institutions of pension funds and insurance companies, we provide a 
consistent analysis of institutional investors that includes pension funds, insurance 
companies, and investment companies both at the aggregated and disaggregated 
levels. At the aggregate level, we found that institutional investors significantly 
Granger causes stock market developments and economic growth. However, we do 
not find such evidence with the banks. At the disaggregated level, we found that 
market capitalization Ganger causes the development of contractual savings 
institutions of pension funds and insurance companies. While these contractual 
savings institutions Granger causes liquidity and turnover in the stock market, the 
results suggest that the maturity and large coverage of these institutional investors 
have diluted the impact in deepening the stock market. In turn, the ‘risk averseness’ of 
these contractual savings institutions in holding large capitalized and diversified stock 
portfolio verifies the reverse causality evidence. Contrary to a passive ‘buy and hold’ 
strategy, the uni-direction causality to both market liquidity and turnover verifies that 
contractual savings institutions actively manage their portfolios. Another key finding 
of this study is the significant role of investment companies in Granger causing both 
financial sector development and economic growth. While both contractual savings 
institutions exhibit uni-directional causality on economic growth, we found a dynamic 
relationship between investment companies and growth due to the risk taking 
activities of investment companies. 
  
Key words: Institutional Investors, Financial Sector Development, Economic Growth, 
Granger Causality 
JEL classifications: C33, G21, G22, G23, G28 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“The evolution of financial system is guided by the principle that the overall 
financial functions of resource allocation over time are organized as efficient as the 
institutional and regulating framework is allowing it. The evolution of institutional 
investors is the result of further efforts to adapt and improve the functions of financial 
systems under the competitive processes which are in force. The long-term 
development of financial systems normally proceeds from self financing or informal 
financing through banking to securities markets. Macroeconomic and structural 
factors as well as the legal regulatory framework determine the progress and speed 
with which an economy passes these stages. Generally, securities markets only 
develop within a satisfactory framework for enforcing property rights and financial 
contracts as well as with a solid banking sector and a sound information system. 
Usually, this later stage is also characterised by a more sophisticated financial 
structure, including, for example rating agencies which help alleviate information 
problems. In more mature financial systems institutional investors such as pension 




 The importance of financial institutions in economic development, especially 
the role of stock markets and banks is greatly discussed in both theoretical and 
empirical studies (see Levine (2003) for the survey of the literature). The key findings 
of these studies are that countries with better developed financial institutions tend to 
growth faster, particularly the size of the banking system and the liquidity of the stock 
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markets tend to have strong positive impact on economic growth (Beck and Levine, 
2002; Beck et. al., 1999; Arestis et. al., 2001). As compared to stock markets and 
financial intermediaries, studies on the role and function of non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFI) in the overall economic development have been very sparse in the 
literature. Although most studies predict the impact of financial institutions on 
economic growth, they do not explicitly discuss the issues of causality and the impact 
of non-bank financial institutions on economic growth. In this study, we explicitly 
examine the impact of non-bank financial institutions, in particular the impact of 
institutional investors on financial sector development and economic growth of the 
OECD countries in a dynamic framework. 
Non-bank financial institutions, especially institutional investors such as 
pension funds, insurance companies and investment companies, have increasingly 
become an important component of the financial sector1. Recent studies tend to 
highlight the importance of institutional investors in the overall development of the 
financial markets in OECD countries (see Merton and Bodie, 1995; Vittas, 1998; 
Impavido et. al., 2000). However, the key shortcomings of these studies are that they 
do not address the impact of the institutional investors on the development of the 
financial sector and the overall economic growth of the domestic economy. In fact, 
most of these studies have only focused disproportionately on the study of pension 
funds. This academic exercise seeks to unify the study of institutional investors under 
a similar methodological framework. A key objective of this study is to analyze the 
causal relationship issues between the growth of institutional investor, financial 
                                                           
1 Institutional investors as defined by OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook include 




sector development (banks and stock market) and economic growth as outlined in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: The Institutional Investor, Financial Sector and Economic Growth  













Implicit in Figure 1 is the determination of the direction of causality. As 
Patrick (1966) has rightly pointed out, economic growth can either supply-lead 
through growth in financial development, or alternatively, financial development can 
be demand-lead through the growth in the economy. We extend Patrick’s idea by 
examining the dynamic causality role of institutional investors in a panel analysis. 
The study examines two key causality issues with respect to institutional investors. 
Firstly, we examine whether the financial sector development (banking and stock 
market) is a precondition for the growth of institutional investors or whether 
institutional investors stimulate financial market developments. Secondly, we study 
whether institutional investors contribute directly to economic growth, even after 
controlling for bank and stock market contributions. 
This study incorporates the dynamic causality role of institutional investors in 
a PVAR (henceforth, PVAR) framework2. While a dynamic analysis is clearly not 
                                                           
2 See Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) on the application of PVAR framework on the study of equity 
markets and economic growth. Our study fundamentally differs from theirs in terms of focusing on the 
dynamic relationship between institutional investors, financial markets (stock markets and banks) and 
economic growth. 
Institutional investors: 
• Pension Fund 
• Insurance Company 
• Investment Company 
Financial Sector 
• Banking 








possible in a cross country setting, the lack of sufficiently long dataset limits the 
applicability of a multivariate time-series country-specific VAR study. The advantage 
of using the PVAR is that in addition to the cross-sectional variability, it also accounts 
for the time-series variability in the data, thereby providing the dynamic framework to 
study the causal relationship between variables in a panel framework. To control for 
the unobserved effects, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) propose to ‘first-difference’ the 
estimation equations to eliminate the unobserved effects and then use instrumental 
variables to control for the endogeneity in the model. However, Arellano and Bond 
(1991) highlighted that the instruments as suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) 
do not completely control for the potential endogeniety of all regressors. As proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991), we employ a General Methods of Moments 
(henceforth, GMM) technique that uses instruments based on previous realizations of 
the explanatory variables to account for the endogeniety in our model, which robustly 
accounts for the endogeniety of the regressors and hence provides more efficient and 
unbiased estimation. The study covers 23 OECD countries over a span of thirteen 
years from 1988 to 1999.  
The results of our study suggest that institutional investors have strong causal 
impact on stock market development and economic growth, but not on the 
development of the financial intermediaries. The disaggregated analysis of different 
components of institutional investors indicates that the stock market variable of 
market capitalization Ganger causes the development of contractual savings 
institutions of pension funds and insurance companies. While these contractual 
savings institutions Granger causes liquidity and turnover in the stock market, the 
results suggest that the maturity and large coverage of these institutional investors 
have diluted the impact in deepening the stock market. In turn, the ‘risk averseness’ of 
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these contractual savings institutions in holding large capitalized stock portfolio 
verifies the reverse causality evidence. Contrary to a passive ‘buy and hold’ strategy, 
the uni-direction causality to both market liquidity and turnover verifies that 
contractual savings institutions actively manage their portfolios. There is also strong 
evidence that the activities of the investment companies Granger causes both the 
financial markets and economic growth.  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an 
introductory outline of the general roles of each institutional investor and its place in 
the financial sector of an economy. Chapter 3 identifies the channels through which 
institutional investors augments the efficiency of financial markets. In this chapter, 
possible economic growth impact either directly or indirectly through the financial 
markets is also discussed. Chapter 4 presents a preliminary descriptive analysis of 
institutional investors in OECD countries and outlines the panel methodology 
employed. Results are assessed in Chapter 5 and policy prescriptions and the 












Chapter 2: Characteristics of Institutional Investors 
 
Institutional investors are basically specialized ‘non-bank’ financial 
institutions that manage savings collectively on behalf of small investors towards a 
specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, return maximization, and claims. 
Institutional investors consist of pension funds, insurance companies and investment 
companies. In addition, both pension funds and insurance companies are collectively 
known as contractual savings institutions due to the ‘contractual obligation’ imposed 
on individuals, as opposed to the ‘voluntary’ and ‘discretional’ choice for individuals 
to invest in investment companies 
 
2.1 Institutional investors and the financial system 
Financial systems consist of both markets3 and institutions. Generally, the 
latter can be demarcated into two major sections, bank and non-bank financial 
intermediaries (NBFI) that includes institutional investors, market markers (security 
dealers), leasing companies and other financial services providers (see appendix Table 
A1). The growing importance of institutional investors vis-à-vis other financial 
institutions will have important financial sector and economic growth implications. 




                                                           
3 Financial markets consist trading of [a] Debt (promise to pay fixed amounts at fixed days in the 
future; [b] Equity (claims over the residual earnings of a business); [c] Contingent Instruments (e.g. 
insurance, warranties, guarantees) and [d] Derivatives (promises to enter into transactions involving 
physical commodities, debt, equity and even contingent instruments, at a future point in time at prices 
determined at the time of entering the derivative contract (Carmichael and Pomerleano 2002). 
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2.2 Functions of Institutional Investors 
Table 1 provides a general description of each individual institutional investor. 
Table 1: Pension Funds, Insurance Companies and Investment Companies 
 Pension Fund Insurance Company Investment Company 
Function Collect, pool and invest 
funds contributed by 
sponsors and beneficiaries 
to provide for the future 
pension entitlements of 
beneficiaries 
 
- Sponsored by employers 
such as companies, public 
corporations, or industry or 
trade groups. 
Personal pensions (contracts 
between individuals and life 
insurance companies) are 
also common. 
Long-term institutional 
investors with a large share 
of tradable assets in their 
portfolios.  
 
- Other services offered 
include long-term savings 
vehicles for pension and 
repayment loans schemes 
for house purchase, etc.  
 
Vehicles for the pooling of 
assets for investment 
purposes. 
 
- differ from the long-term 
institutions by offering short 
term liquidities on pools of 
funds, albeit at rates that 
depend on current market 
prices, either via direct 
redemption of holdings 
(open-end funds) or via the 
ability to trade shares on 
exchanges (closed-end funds 
– a special type of closed-
end funds are hedge funds). 
Returns - Defined contribution funds 
(DCPP, purely dependent on 
the market). 
- Defined benefits funds 
(DBPP, guarantee of the rate 
of return by the sponsor). 
- Nominal (offering a 
guaranteed return that is 
fixed in money terms). 
- Variable or option features 
with variable return by a 
guaranteed floor. 
 
Market determined by 
investment in equities, 
bonds and other financial 
instruments. 
- open-end funds are obliged 
to sell and buy at current net 
asset value (NAV) 
- close-end funds can and 
often do trade at a discount 
to NAV 
Interrelation- 
ship   
Pension funds include 
elements of social security 
beyond that of providing 
sufficient retirement income 
(health insurance, annuities, 
mutual fund investment 
characteristics like the US 
401(k) plans, etc.) 
Close links with pension 
funds: 
- annuities for guarantying 
pension benefits. 
- guaranteed investment 
contracts purchased by 
pension funds. 
- provide defined 
contribution pensions 
directly. 
- act as external asset 
managers for pension funds. 
- offer insurance to defined 
benefit funds on behalf of 
small employers. 
Portfolio holdings by 
investment companies are 
not only held by household 
but also by pension funds 
and insurance companies. 
Locus of risk 
bearing 
Held by institution for 
DBPPs. 
Risk borne by individual for 
DCPPs. 
- Insurance contract having 
guaranteed returns. 
-Variable linked insurance 
contract. 
End investors are residual 






DBPP – similar as insurance 
companies 
 
DCPP – intermediate  
Tighter regulation reflecting 
the fiduciary of obligation: 
- solvency requirements, 
restriction on asset 
allocation, etc. 
 
Lightly regulated:  
- information disclosure to 
investors  
- hedge funds have lesser 
restrictions). 
Source: Adapted from Eichengreen (1999), Davis and Steil (2001) and Blommestein and Funke (1998). 
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2.2.1 Pension Fund 
Pension funds are essentially long-term investors4. From the pension fund’s 
perspective, income receipts are known with considerable accuracy because a fixed 
percentage of each employee’s salary is usually contributed to the fund although the 
distinction between mandatory or voluntary contribution mechanisms is not made. 
Moreover, pension funds are usually not subjected to sudden withdrawals of assets. 
As both cash inflow and outflow are relatively easy to forecast, pension funds are 
directed towards the purchase of long-term investment products like bonds, real estate 
and common stock.  This study also does not make any distinction between private 
and public institutions5. We believe that the interaction between financial sector 
development, growth and pension funds may materialize even if private pension funds 
represent a small, but significant part of the pension system. It is not necessary to 
implement a complete privatization of social security to obtain the capital market and 
economic growth benefits of private pension funds. In fact, a mixed private/public 
pension system may be preferable as it allows a diversification across providers and 
may offer better protection against the long-term volatility of capital markets (Vittas 
1998). The study of institutional investors has mainly focused heavily on the role of 
pension fund, and it is the aim of this academic exercise to provide an equal analysis 




                                                           
4 Core to the development of pension fund is the ‘three-pillar approach’. In this model, old age poverty 
alleviation is channelled through a government funded first pillar which is usually characterized by 
pay-as-you-go, mandatory and defined-benefit. The second pillar comprises the occupational provision 
of pensions, which is usually pre-funded, often mandatory but sometimes voluntary, and either of the 
defined-benefit or the defined-contribution type. A voluntary third pillar is provided for additional 
retirement savings beyond the mandated minimum. 
5 Analytics derived from a differential model of objectives, incentive, and investment behaviour 
between private and publicly administered pension fund would be beneficial.  
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2.2.2 Insurance Company 
Insurance companies specialize in providing contingent promises by 
underwriting economic risk associated with death, illness, damage to or loss of 
property, and other exposure to losses. Insurance companies are generally subdivided 
into life and non-life insurance companies. Life insurance companies agree to make a 
payment in the event of the death of the person who holds the policy. In addition, the 
life insurance company may also be active in the area of providing retirement benefits 
and are inclined to commit their funds long-term due to the high predictability of the 
cash inflows and outflows. Catalan, Impavido and Musalem (2000) analyzed the 
insurance industry separately into its life and non-life components. Instead of 
following this approach, we have aggregated the life and non-life insurance industry 
as contracts of more than one year is generally perceived as ‘long-term’ and most 
risk-averse household are inclined to insure the full lifetime of their assets. This is 
similar to the approach by Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) who believe that the 
aggregation of life and non-life insurance may not be too unreasonable. ‘If one views 
the key economic effects of insurance as risk transfer, indemnification and financial 
intermediation, then the benefits of risk transfer and indemnification are likely to be 
major characteristics of non-life, while financial intermediation is a primary aspect of 
life insurance. Thus, an aggregated approach will embrace all these ideas with the 
same analysis.’ (Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000 pp.490) 
 
2.2.3 Investment Company 
Investment companies are corporations or trusts whose sole business is to 
make investments on behalf of individuals and institutions based on a common goal. 
A fund endeavours to do a better job of investing participant’s funds and managing 
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investments as compared to individual investors. Investment fund invest in a wide 
range of products including common stocks, preferred stocks, corporate bonds, tax-
free municipal bonds, sovereign bonds, zero coupon bonds, convertible securities, 
commodity based securities, foreign securities and real estate. Generically, investment 
funds are either open or closed-ended and both are managed either actively or 
passively according to the preference of investors.  
In the study of institutional investors, usually the role of investment companies 
(or more commonly know as mutual funds in the US) is either not developed or when 
developed, centres round the trading volatility implied by these specific investors, 
especially hedge funds. The core hypothesis of this study is that while investment 
companies may have a shorter horizon outlook relative to both pension funds and 
insurance companies, the role of investment companies is vital as it channels savings 
from being managed individually by households to the hands of professional, large 
and diversified managers. Additionally, there are a growing number of pension funds 
and insurance companies channelling their funds to be managed externally by these 
investment companies. In this sense, the fiduciary role of investment companies must 
be enhanced to ensure that the objectives of the investors in these investment 
companies are coherent with those who they appoint to manage their funds.  
 
2.2.4 Convergence in Pension Fund, Insurance and Investment Companies 
Whilst the above discussion provides a neat demarcation between various 
institutional investors, in reality, the distinction between these institutional investors 
themselves is not very clear. For example, investment companies are increasingly 
being used as a vehicle for retirement savings, pension savings often have a life 
insurance aspect and insurance companies are offering both pension provision and 
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launching their own investment funds. Beside institutional investors, by virtue of its 
extensive distribution, marketing and capital-base, banks have been actively involved 
in the provision of core institutional investor services by purchasing or launching their 
own insurance companies, selling their own investment funds and personal pension  
plans.6 The growing importance of off-balance sheet and fee earning activities are 
reflective of the ‘universalization of the banking sector even in countries such as the 
United Kingdom and the United States where activity of banks has been traditionally 
restricted’ (Rybczynski 1995). To ensure a meaningful analysis, this study limits the 
role of banks to its traditional function of accepting deposits and making loans. 
 This chapter has outlined the basic functions of pension funds, insurance 
companies and investment companies. Increasingly, not only are these activities no 
longer mutually exclusive to each institutional investor, but there has also been a 
growing involvement of banks in the provision of pension, insurance and investments 
services. The next chapter will analyze the causality issue within the institutional 










                                                           
6 Deregulation has been the main force in allowing the banking sector to offer complimentary or 
competing products that were originally the closed privilege of specific segments of the financial 
sector. At a more macro level, this trend has evolved into the creation of financial conglomerates that 
are involved in both bank and non-banked based activities. 
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Chapter 3: Institutional Investors, Financial Markets and  
                              Economic Growth 
 
This chapter seeks to answer two key causal issues. Firstly, is the financial 
sector development a precondition for the growth of institutional investors or do 
institutional investors stimulate financial market developments? Secondly, do 
institutional investors contribute directly to economic growth even after controlling 
for bank and stock market contributions, or does economic growth spur the 
development of institutional investors? 
 
3.1 Institutional Investors and Financial Sector Development 
Institutional investors are expected to improve the efficiency of the financial 
sector. ‘To an extent that varies between countries, institutional investors have proven 
able to fulfil many of the functions of a financial system better than their competitors; 
such as banks and direct holding of securities by the household sector’ (Davis 1995). 
Hence the study of institutional investors along Merton and Bodie’s (1995) functional 
framework formalizes the impact of these institutional investors on the financial 
market7. Basically, this approach seeks to define functions that financial system is 
always called upon to fulfil, regardless of the type of agent or institutional functional 
form. It thus provides a constant set of features in examining the growth of 
institutional investors as a form of adaptation and improvements in the ways these 
functions are fulfilled under the pressure of competitive forces. In the context of this 
framework, growth of institutional investors is explicable in terms of either a 
changing comparative advantage in the functions they fulfil (supply side factors) or an 
increased demand for certain functions on behalf of the end users (demand side 
                                                           
7 See Blommestein and Funke (1998), and Davis and Steil (2001) for a detailed study. 
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factors). Merton and Bodie (1995) outlined the six functional roles of financial 
institutions and we will subsequently examine how institutional investors can improve 
on these functions. Formally, these functions are outlined in the following six 
subsections.  
 
3.1.1 Clearing and settling payments to facilitate exchange for goods,   
services and assets. 
 
Institutional investors have played a key role in the modernization of market 
trading. While ‘bloc trading by institutional investors has led to the abolition of 
minimum commissions and the restructuring of stock market operations, institutional 
investors have also promoted more efficient clearing facilities and establishment of 
central depository agencies that facilitate the move to book-entry systems and provide 
safekeeping services. They have also exerted pressure for modern efficient and 
reliable back-office operations’ (Vittas 1998).   
In addition to this, institutional investors, especially investment companies 
have played a major role in the development of money market funds especially in 
France and US. Essentially, investment companies pool retail savings and invest it at 
the wholesale level, thus offering higher rate of returns for short-term investments as 
compared to conventional bank deposits. Investors in these money market funds are 
allowed to redeem funds by the use of cheques, thus giving transactions services 
identical to bank accounts. Since both are capable of offering liquidity, payments 
services, and savings services, the essential difference comes down to capital 
guarantee. Whereas the bank promises to repay a fixed amount, the institutional 
investor promises a market-related return. There is thus a fundamental difference in 
the nature of the promise being made and the risk being borne by the investor.  
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These developments not only increased competition to banks on the liability 
side, but also eroded their footing on the asset side. Disintermediation of wholesale 
markets (CDs, CP, deposits notes, swaps and repos) encouraged corporations to 
switch to money markets for their short-term financing needs, thus disintermediating 
banks loans and advances. 
 
3.1.2 Pooling of funds  
Institutional investors’ main contribution to a market is that they are a large 
and reliable source of financial resources. The size and economies of scale enables 
these institutional investors to pool and maximise return for a given risk profile of 
individual investors. For example, securitization of individual assets such as loans, 
have provided a ready supply of assets in which institutional investors may invest in 
competition with banks. This evidently leads to more efficient primary markets. In 
addition to this, it is growing more evidently that household sector are reducing direct 
securities holdings due to higher risk, cost and low liquidity, while the proportion of 
equities and bonds held via institutions has tended to increase. More importantly, 
institutional investors like pension funds and life insurance companies provide a 
constant demand for securities and provide the market with liquidity and stability, 
thereby reducing the transaction costs for investors (Aggarwal 1993). 
 
3.1.3 Transfer of economic resources over time, across geographic regions, 
or among industries 
 
While there is still controversy whether institutional investors have 
contributed to a quantitative increase in household savings, the general consensus is 
that institutionalization has qualitatively increased the supply of long-term funds to 
capital markets. Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2002a) have shown empirically that 
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pension funds and insurance companies collectively ‘provides an institutional 
framework favoring the accumulation of long-term capital’. As the institutionalization 
of savings firstly establishes and consequently flattens the yield curve, it will 
stimulate the growth of the debt and other financial instrument markets. In turn, this 
provides a further stimulus to the development of institutional investors. 
As regards to transfers across space, there has been is an increase in the 
volume of international portfolio investment by institutional investors, which has 
supplanted the bank driven flows that were typical of the 1970s. The uneven pace of 
demographic changes, as well as differences in saving and investment between 
countries (Grundfest 1990), suggest that net cross-border flows are likely to 
accompany, and accentuate further shifts by institutional investors. Other autonomous 
factors encouraging the growth of foreign asset holdings include improved global 
communications, liberalization and increase competition in financial markets, 
abolition of exchange controls and deregulation of institutional investor foreign 
portfolio holdings. For example, pension funds in Australia, Japan, Norway, 
Netherlands, UK and US have no quantitative restrictions on foreign asset holdings 
(see appendix Table A2). However there still remains a great deal of scope for 
expanding international investment of institutional investors. Current portfolio shares 
of international assets are not optimal and well below those which would minimize 
risk for a given return.  
Besides that, the development of institutional investors may have an indirect 
impact on domestic financial markets. For instance it may signal to foreign investors a 
sound and stable domestic financial system, hence leading to significant cross-border 
transactions of securities. On the contrary, the development of domestic financial 
markets is less stimulated when contractual savings invest a larger proportion of their 
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funds abroad. However restricting the foreign investments of institutional investors 
for the sole purpose of stimulating the domestic financial system is likely to be 
counter-productive as argued by Impavido, Musalem and Vittas (2002). 
 
3.1.4 Manage uncertainty and control risk  
The role of institutional investors in managing uncertainty and controlling risk 
has led to the development of innovative financial products and investment strategies. 
Derivatives and its hybrids have been introduced or developed especially to cater for 
needs of institutional investors. This is predominantly due to the fact that institutional 
investors are well placed as opposed to households in employing derivatives and other 
sophisticated means of risk control on their portfolio. For example, Bodie (1990) 
suggests that the need of hedging against shortfalls of assets against liabilities by 
defined-benefit pension funds has led to the development of a number of financial 
innovations such as the zero coupon bonds and index futures. Besides that, the basic 
securitisation process conducted by institutional investors is itself a means of pricing 
and trading risks of securities market. More importantly, derivatives like stock index 
futures which would later be translated into stocks are seen as particularly useful in 
tactical asset allocation and facilitating rapid shifts between different national 
markets. Besides spurring innovation in developing new instruments, institutional 
investors also encourage the entrance of market participants like risk taking agencies, 
advisors, consultants and custodians. 
The growth of institutional investors has also lead to the development of 
innovative investment strategies. Immunisation strategies undertaken by insurance 
companies facilitate sharing and unbundling of risk. For example, pension funds 
writing call options on equities can be seen as converting them into short-term fixed-
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income securities for matching purposes. Another strategy is holding assets in excess 
of the legal minimum prescribed by funding requirements in equities, as long as their 
proportion is reduced when the market value of pension assets falls. This strategy is 
known as portfolio insurance or contingent immunization, and has stimulated 
development of index options and futures markets. In summary, the tools and 
strategies brought about by institutional investors have enhanced the management of 
risks and uncertainties. 
 
3.1.5 Provision of price information 
The provision of price information helps coordinate decentralized decision 
making in various sectors of the economy. An important effect linked to institutional 
investors is their need for timely, reliable and adequate information on operations, 
investment and payout policies of invested corporations (Castillo 1993). Institutional 
investors, bestowed with economics of scale, good information and low transactions 
costs, are likely to speed the adjustment of asset prices to fundamental values, 
entailing price volatility to the extent that the fundamentals are themselves volatile. 
Econometric study by Davis (1988) shows that the portfolio distributions of life 
insurers and pension funds in five of the G7 countries are strongly influenced by 
relative asset returns, particularly where there are few regulations governing portfolio 
distributions and low transactions costs, as in the United Kingdom and the United 
States. These results did not hold where transactions costs are high and regulations are 
strict as in Germany, Japan and Canada. Superior ability to employ price information 
is also suggested by studies that initial public offerings subscribed largely by 
institutional investors tend to do well as opposed to those purchased largely by the 
general public. Field (1995) confirms this in her study that initial public offerings with 
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higher institutional ownership soon after the offering date earn significantly higher 
long-run returns, while initial public offering with smaller institutional shareholdings 
frequently earn less than the risk-free rate in the long-run. The provision and 
dissemination of price information is not limited by geographical boundaries and thus 
cross-border portfolio investment by institutional investors will lead to the 
equalization of total returns (and hence cost of capital) between markets. ‘Such a 
process occurs as investment managers’ shift between over and under-valued markets 
via tactical asset allocation (utilizing price information). Increased efficiency, 
reflected in accuracy of market prices enables capital to flow to its most productive 
use and savers to maximize their return at a global scale’ (Davis, 2003). 
 
3.1.6 Dealing with incentive problems   
Institutional investors have a comparative advantage over individual investors 
in dealing with issues of corporate governance8. The size and voting weights of 
institutional investors helps alleviate the asymmetric information problem and 
principal agent dilemma in corporate governance. Besides that, control and 
enforcement contracts conducted on an individual investor basis are costly. 
Furthermore there is no incentive for individual investors to monitor the management 
of the companies they invests in as others can free- ride on their actions. Davis (2003) 
identified four basic corporate governance practices employed by institutional 
investors. ‘These are market control via equity (takeovers); market control via debt 
(leveraged buyouts, LBOs and leveraged takeovers); direct control via equity (the 
corporate governance movement); and direct control via debt (relationship banking). 
Generally, the development of institutional investors will tend to shift a financial 
                                                           
8 The corporate governance problem is usually traced back to Berle and Means (1932) who analyzed 
the problem in terms of separation of ownership and control. 
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system towards a combination of the first three and away from the fourth’. More 
specifically, the traditional French state controlled banking sector, the Japanese 
keiretsu arrangement of banks and firms and the German universal banking 
mechanism have increasingly employed the Anglo-Saxon  model of ‘direct control 
via equity’. Growing shareholder activism by institutional investors is ensured 
through the development of appropriate mechanisms for the selection and replacement 
of representatives of the relevant interest parties, the provision of specific powers for 
them to inquire into and report on matters of concern to shareholders as well as 
supporting other elements of policy proposed by management. This could imply 
pressure on firms for higher and more sustained dividend payments; greater provision 
of information by firms; removal of underperforming managers; challenging 
excessive executive compensation; appointment of more independent non-executives; 
and equal treatment in takeovers. Empirically, Davis (2003) finds that in Anglo Saxon 
countries, ‘a larger institutional share of equity implies that distribution of profits in 
dividends is stimulated at the macro level ….. and productivity growth is improved at 
the economy wide level, implying that use of capital and labour is improved by 
institutional investment’. On balance, studies by Wahal (1996) and Strickland (1996) 
give support that institutional activism would have a positive impact on corporate 
governance9. 
The study of institutional investors along these functional lines warrants 
further inspection as these institutional changes are a catalyst for increased financial 
efficiency and innovation. Whilst the function of these financial systems remains 
                                                           
9 Hadden (1993) identified four major limitations on governance by institutional investors. These 
include the differing objectives of institutional investors in maximizing the value of their investment 
rather than the companies they invest in; legislative prohibitions like laws on insider trading and related 
party conduct limits the governance role of institutional investors; preoccupation of shareholders rights 
by institutional investors maybe at the expense of employee and societal concerns; and the difficulty of 
institutional investors governance in foreign and multi-layer companies.  
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constant over time, different institutional change brings with it improvements of 
efficiency and innovation to these core functions10. This may further spur the 
development of financial systems and in turn provide additional stimulus to the 
development of institutional investors. Implicit in employing Merton and Bodie’s 
functional analysis is the hypothesis that financial sector development is a prerequisite 
for the development of institutional investors. However, institutional investors 
themselves can be an important catalyst to the development of the financial market. 
Thus this study will carefully examine the dynamic causality issues between 
institutional investors and the various segments of the financial market which includes 
the stock market and banking sector. 
 
3.2 Institutional Investors and Economic Growth 
The preceding section has outlined both the six main roles of the financial 
market and how institutional investors have improved upon the efficiency of these six 
functions. Subsequently, this section will further develop the possible economic 
growth channels for each institutional investor. While there will be some degree of 
overlap to discussion in the preceding section, this section seeks to identify the exact 
economic growth relationship and highlight the main contribution of each individual 
institutional investors. Specifically, this study accounts for this economic growth 
effect by examining the ‘residual’ growth effects after accounting for various 
financial sector development indicators. Thus the causality issue examined is whether 
institutional investor causes economic growth or whether economic growth causes 
                                                           
10 Vittas (1999) identified four preconditions for institutional investors (in particular contractual 
savings institutions) to have an impact on the financial market. These include critical mass of 
institutional investors which is necessary but not sufficient, adoption of an optimizing behavior by 
institutional investors, conducive regulation and finally, the existence of a pluralistic structure to ensure 
sufficient competition and diversification.  
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institutional investors’ development. The following sections discuss each component 
of institutional investment contribution to economic growth.  
  
3.2.1 Pension Fund and Economic Growth 
Private pension funds reduce the need for costly social security systems by 
providing for retirement income and reducing the old age healthcare expenses. At 
present, most defined benefit pay-as-you-go social pension systems like in Germany 
and Italy are actuarially in deficit, and a move towards a ‘second pillar’ fully-funded 
defined contribution system operated by either the government or the private sector 
will reduce government expenditure. Furthermore, this pension reform establishes a 
close link between contribution and benefits which will reduce labour market 
distortions associated with traditional unfunded programs (World Bank, 1994). For 
example, generous social pension system may encourage early retirement among the 
working population11. Pension fund essentially lengthens the term structure of retail 
savings. In turn, this promotes the development of long-term financing markets and 
balances the need for foreign capital inflows especially in developing countries in 
financing costly and long-term development projects. In fact, the Asian crisis 
highlighted the imbalance between short-term foreign borrowing liabilities that are 
financed by domestically generated assets.  
A pioneering work in the pension fund-growth nexus was carried out by 
Holzmann (1997)12. Employing Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) in an endogenous 
growth setting, he showed that the development of financial markets after Chile’s 
                                                           
11 To alleviate this problem, France has mandated an increase in the retirement age for public 
employees. 
12 Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995) employed an overlapping-generations model and find that 
pension reform could substantially raise long-term growth rates by eliminating the incentives (under 
the pay-as-you-go system) to informalize production and employment. Unlike Holzmann (1997) who 
found the direct impact of Chile’s pension reform on savings to be low and initially negative, Corsetti 
and Schmidt-Hebbel find evidence that Chile’s reform contributed to large increases in private savings. 
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1981 pension reform correlates with economic growth, via rising TFP and capital 
accumulation. Holzmann estimates that the long-term growth in Chile is annually 1 to 
3 percent higher, due to the effects of the pension reform operating via financial 
markets. Fontaine (1997) notes that pension fund development facilitated internal 
resource transfers. It enabled the Chilean government to service its international debts 
without extreme fiscal adjustment, by providing a domestic source of borrowing 
without requiring excessively high interest rates. Hansell (1992) suggests that the 
development of pension funds have been a major factor behind Chile’s bonds being 
rated investment grade, the first Latin American country’s bonds to be rated so since 
the debt crisis mainly due to its better disclosure and corporate governance standards. 
Similar results will be extrapolated for developed counties in this study. More 
importantly, we will also examine the possibility of reverse causality whereby the 
development of financial markets is a key ingredient to the development of pension 
funds.  
 
3.2.2 Insurance Companies and Economic Growth 
The causal relationship between the insurance industry13 and economic growth 
is a recent development. From a functional perspective, Skipper (1998) identified 
seven categories of insurance services that are important to economic growth. Firstly, 
insurance companies promote financial stability and anxiety reduction through the 
indemnification of risk at the individual, societal, corporate and national level. 
                                                           
 
13 Health care insurance is a growing concern in OECD countries. In 2003, Germany reformed it costly 
public health care system by trimming the tax used to pay for health insurance, reducing some health 
benefits and requiring some co-payments by patients. In light of the demographic changes, high-quality 
medical care will remain affordable over the long-term only if a greater degree of full funding is built 
into the health insurance system. Hence in the Netherlands, mandatory public health insurance and 
private providers exist side by side. Switzerland reorganized its health care system in the 1990’s and 
now there are more than 100 private, independent insurance companies in regulated competition with 
each other, while the American health care system has the strongest free-market elements. 
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Secondly, insurance companies are viable substitutes for costly government social 
security programs14. Thirdly, insurance companies facilitate trade and commerce at 
both the domestic and international level. Moreover, insurance also facilitates 
innovation by offering to underwrite new risk especially in new growth areas like 
pharmaceuticals. Fourthly, an insurance company mobilize savings on a contractual 
basis and transforms the short-term nature of retail savings to a longer-term basics, 
whilst maintaining liquidity for claims. Fifth, and perhaps the key role of insurance 
companies is the enhancement of risk management through effective risk pricing, 
transformation and pooling. Essentially, insurance companies identify, evaluate and 
implement the most effective and efficient means of managing risk. Sixth, insurance 
companies encourages loss mitigation by the insured through efficient pricing and 
insurance availability. This is actuarially analyzed to ensure that the trade-off balance 
between loss mitigation and the moral hazard problem is tipped in favour of the 
former. Finally, insurance companies foster a more efficient capital allocation through 
its prudent investment activities. The services conferred by the insurance companies 
are fundamental to economic growth .The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD, 1964: 55) acknowledges early on that ‘a sound national 
insurance and reinsurance15 market is an essential characteristics of economic 
growth’. Skipper (1998) also believes that the more developed and efficient a 
country’s insurance market, the greater will its contribution to economic prosperity, 
other things being the same. 
                                                           
14 A Swiss Reinsurance Company (1987) study found a significant negative relationship between social 
expenditures and life insurance premiums in 10 OECD countries.  
15 Insurance sold to the public and to noninsurance commercial and industrial enterprises is classified 
as direct insurance. Insurance purchased by direct writing insurers to hedge their own insurance 
portfolios is called reinsurance and is sold by reinsurers. Reinsurance is wholesale insurance. 
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On the other hand, economic growth entails more complex loss exposure and 
greater risk. This is because, with increasing concentrations of property and people, 
and increasingly complex servicing, manufacturing and industrial processes, 
businesses have come to appreciate that they are exposed to greater risk and that they 
must manage risks more efficiently and effectively to be competitive. Besides this, 
risks that were traditionally managed at the individual and societal level can be 
effectively managed at the national and even international level. While proposing a 
functional approach in analysing the role of insurance companies in economic growth, 
Skipper (1998) also acknowledges a stylized correlation between economic growth 
and risk. Hence this study will examine the exact direction of causality by allowing 
the possibility of reverse causality resulting from economic growth to development in 
the insurance industry. 
 
3.2.3 Investment Companies and Economic Growth 
A key role of investment companies is in its ability to pool and mobilize savings 
professionally for a large number of households. This ‘quasi-bank’ intermediary role 
is generally regulated lesser than the banking sector and signals a paradigm shift in 
the risk locus from financial institutions to households. This evidently reduces the 
moral hazard problem of government guaranteed bank deposits. More importantly, 
investment companies increases the savings choices of households by providing a 
broader range of risk-return options and are more flexible than contractual savings 
institutions. In addition to this, households will generally invest in prudentially 
managed funds with good performance. This ‘risk retailization’ will be an important 
disciplinatory market mechanism, punishing bad investment companies and 
rewarding the better ones. The ability of investment companies in efficiently 
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mobilizing savings for a vast number of households will widen and deepen capital 
markets. Their professional investment conduct will create incentive for improved 
performance, pressure for risk reduction and enhance demand for better financial 
infrastructure, disclosure and governance. Besides that, the ability of investment 
companies in providing liquidity according to the specific needs of its investors, 
introducing innovative product and investment strategies, exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities and diversifying investment across products and national boundaries 
will enhance the financial sector efficiency and this will have a positive spillover 
effect on the economy.  
 
3.3 Remarks 
Institutional investors interact dynamically with both financial sector 
development and economic growth. ‘It has been shown that institutional investors 
exert a major influence on the non-financial as well as the financial sector… notably 
by increasing holdings of longer-term instruments, changes in patterns of international 
investments, various effects on corporate finance and corporate governance, and an 
impact on government fiscal, regulatory and monetary policies. On balance these 
effects are favorable, as they tend in the direction of greater economic efficiency at a 
national level…’ (Davis and Steil, 2001). Implicit in the discussion is the focus on a 
uni-directional relationship from institutional investor development to both financial 
sector development and economic growth. However, this relationship can be dynamic 
with a possibility of reverse causality from either economic growth or financial sector 
development to institutional investors. The causality permutation between 
institutional investor, financial sector development and economic growth increases 
once pension funds, insurance companies and investment companies are examined 
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individually. We hypothesize that causality among the different set of institutional 
investors will depend primarily on its differing risk adverseness characteristics. 
Similarly, Vittas (1998) believes that the causality issue depends on the type of 
institutional investors in question. According to him, ‘pension funds and insurance 
companies are promoted for their own sake and for their potential economic, fiscal, 
and financial benefits, whether or not a country already has well-developed securities 
market. Limited supply of financial instruments would not be a major obstacle to the 
creation of pension funds and insurance companies. The Anglo-American experience 
suggests that pension funds and insurance companies can provide a strong stimulus to 
market development, although this takes time and requires both critical mass and 
conducive regulations.’ Investment companies, by contrast, are unlikely to thrive 
without strong and well-regulated securities markets. The following chapter outlines 
the methodology used to empirically measure the causal effects between institutional 













Chapter 4: Data and Methodology  
 
4.1 Data 
This panel study on 23 OECD countries employed annual data from 1988 to 
1999. The key data, adjusted by US dollar-equivalent was collected from the 
Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook (OECD) and the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank). Table 2 provides a summary of all the variables employed. 
Table 2: Description of the Key Variables Used in the Study 
GDP log [Real GDP (1995) in US dollars] 
MC log [Market Capitalization /GDP] 
VT log [Value Traded / GDP] 
TR log [Value Traded / Market Capitalization] 
DC log [Domestic credit provided by banking sector / GDP] 
IINVEST log [Financial Assets of Institutional Investors / (Financial 
Asset of Institutional Investors + Market Capitalization + 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector)] 
Pen log [Financial Assets of Pension Funds / (Total Financial 
Asset of Institutional Investors + Market Capitalization + 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector)] 
Ins log [Financial Assets of Insurance Companies / (Total 
Financial Asset of Institutional Investors + Market 
Capitalization + Domestic credit provided by banking sector)] 
Invt log [Financial Assets of Investment Companies / (Total 
Financial Asset of Institutional Investors + Market 
Capitalization + Domestic credit provided by banking sector)] 
 
 
4.1.1 Measure of Banking Activity 
The banking sector consists of depository banks and other banking institutions 
(savings and mortgage loan institutions and building and loan associations) that have 
“liabilities in the form of  transferable deposits by check or otherwise usable in 
making payments” (IMF 1984). The domestic credit provided by the banking sector to 
GDP is used as a measure of the activity of financial intermediaries in channeling 
savings to investors. This measures the mobilization of savings by the banking sector 
as it excludes both credit issued to public sector (central and local governments as 
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well as public enterprises) and credit issued to the private sector by central bank. 
Levine and Zervos (1998), Levine, Loayza and Beck (1999) and Beck, Levine, and 
Loayza (1999) have employed this indicator in the examination of the impact of 
financial sector development on economic growth. It is vital to note that this indicator 
measures only the ‘traditional’ role of the banking sector in providing loans and 
advances and does not capture the growing importance of off-balance sheet activities 
(including the provision of insurance, pension and investment services) of  the 
banking sector. Thus, this measure will be able to isolate the main credit activities of 
the financial intermediaries16. 
 
4.1.2 Measures of Stock Market Activity 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) outline three key stock market 
indicators in measuring its size, activity and efficiency.  Stock market capitalization to 
GDP ratio (MC) measures the size of stock market as it aggregates the value of all 
listed shares in the stock market. It is assumed that the overall stock market size is 
positively correlated with the ability to mobilize capital and to diversify risk at an 
economy wide basis17. However, the size of the stock market does not necessarily 
reflect its liquidity. Thus the liquidity of the stock market in channelling capital 
captured by the total value of stocks traded to GDP (VT) ratio, which is defined as the 
total domestic shares traded in the domestic stock exchanges divided by GDP. 
Theoretical models predict countries with illiquid markets will create disincentives to 
long-run investments because it is comparatively difficult to sell one's stake in the 
firm. In contrast, more liquid stock markets reduce disincentives to long-run 
                                                           
16 Table A3 in the appendix summarizes the comparative advantage of banks in providing finance. 
17 The main shortcoming of Market Capitalization is that theory does not suggest the mere listing of 
shares will influence resource allocation and growth. Levine and Zervos (1998) showed that Market 
Capitalization is not a good predictor of economic growth. 
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investment, since liquid markets provide a ready exit-option for investors. This can 
foster more efficient resource allocation and faster growth (Bencivenga et al, 1995). 
 While MC captures the size and VT reflects the level of liquidity, the 
efficiency of the domestic stock market is captured by the Turnover Ratio (TR)18. The 
TR ratio is defined as the ratio of the value of total shares traded and market 
capitalization. A small but active stock market will have a high turnover ratio as 
compared to a large but less liquid stock market. In both these cases, the turnover 
ration would provide a more robust indication of the activity of the stock market. The 
stock market dataset is gathered from the Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (various 
years). 
 
4.1.3 Measures of Institutional Investors Activity 
The role of institutional investors is captured by the ratio of total financial 
assets of institutional investors to GDP. However, as most financial assets of 
institutional investors consist of loans, stock and bonds, we further normalized the 
total financial assets of institutional investors by dividing it with the sum of total 
financial assets of institutional investors, total stock market capitalization and 
domestic credit provided by banking sector. This would provide a better proxy in 
measure the ‘aggregated’ functionality of institutional investors19. We also further 
                                                           
18 Value Traded has some limitations. Firstly, the VT ratio measures the liquidity of the stock market 
with respect to the aggregate economic activity in a country and not the stock market itself. Secondly, 
since markets are forward looking, they will anticipate higher economic growth by higher share prices. 
As Value Traded is the product of quantity and price, this indicator can rise without an increase in the 
number of transactions. Turnover Ratio does not suffer from this shortcoming since both numerator and 
denominator contain the price.  
19 Studies by Catalan, Impavido and Musalem (2000) employ basic measures like contractual savings 
financial assets over GDP to capture the size of contractual savings institutions relative to GDP. This 
suffers from a major problem as financial assets of institutional investors would consist of stock 
portfolio holdings and hence augmenting a multicollinearity problem. Impavido, Musalem and Tressel 
(2003) improved upon this variable by employing a normalization procedure that is similar to this 
study. They further confirm that this normalized variable corrects for price movements that might have 
caused correlation between institutional investors and financial sector development. 
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analyzed the different impact of institutional investor by using disaggregated data for 
pension funds, insurance companies and investment companies respectively. The total 
financial assets pension funds (Pen), insurance companies (Ins) and investment 
companies (Invt) are similarly normalized with the procedure outlined above. This 
variable captures the activities of various institutional investors relative to total 
financial assets in the economy. Since most disaggregated studies mainly focused on 
pension funds or more generally on contractual savings institutions (which combines 
both pension funds and insurance companies20), this study presents a unified and 
consistent treatment in analyzing the independent impact of pension funds, insurance 
companies and investment companies on both financial sector development and 
economic growth.   
 
4.1.4 Measure of Economic Activity 
To measure the level of economic activity, we employ real gross domestic 
product (GDP) at 1995 US prices.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 2 demonstrates a general overview of the rapid growth of the financial 
asset of institutional investors in OECD countries since 1980, rising from US$ 2,500 
billion in 1980 to nearly US$ 35,000 billion in 1999. Table 3 further analyzes this 
phenomenal growth from 1980 onwards by examining the ratio of institutional 
investor’s financial assets to GDP. Relatively, the Anglo-Saxon countries of UK and 
US have a larger institutional investment sector as compared to the bank dominated 
economies like Japan, Germany and France. The importance of institutional 
                                                           
20 In measuring the economic and financial impact of insurance companies, Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2000) used total insurance premium. Similarly, Outreville (1996) also used the ratio of gross domestic 
premiums to GDP in his studies of insurance companies in developing countries. 
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Figure 2: Financial Assets of Institutional Investors (Billion USD) in OECD from  










1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
Financial Assets
 
Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook. Includes the average figures of the of 
twenty-three OECD countries in the studies Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, , Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States plus four other OCED 
countries like Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland and Poland. 
 
 
Table 3: Average Financial Assets of Institutional Investors as a percentage of  
               GDP in OECD form 1980 to 1999 
 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-1999 
Australia - 51.60 62.96 108.85 
Austria 9.54 21.02 26.60 51.70 
Belgium 14.76 38.52 50.78 80.43 
Canada 37.70 54.04 68.84 105.45 
Denmark - 55.95 58.98 81.00 
Finland 15.58 26.48 41.16 74.23 
France 14.28 46.30 65.18 103.10 
Germany 19.86 34.06 38.16 62.58 
Greece - 1.10 4.28 27.83 
Italy - 11.12 22.54 66.68 
Japan - 89.90 84.82 97.23 
Korea 18.22 40.52 52.62 74.75 
Luxembourg - 730.94 1625.96 3081.48 
Mexico 0.54 2.34 6.94 5.85 
Netherlands 83.56 132.26 143.24 176.93 
Norway 17.68 29.94 37.88 47.15 
Portugal - 3.60 19.76 44.68 
Spain 4.68 10.94 22.96 59.55 
Sweden 28.52 51.14 92.64 146.20 
Switzerland 4.66 56.30 103.12 132.63 
Turkey 0.10 0.34 0.70 1.65 
United Kingdom 59.90 115.18 133.72 209.25 
United States 78.00 113.16 133.42 193.90 
Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook (various years). 
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investment in the financial system is readily apparent from the volume of financial 
assets under management, which exceeds that of aggregate GDP for nine OECD 
countries in the sample during the 1996 to 1999 period. In addition to this, the uneven 
distribution of institutional investors’ assets across countries is indicative of the 
considerable scope for further growth, particularly in Greece, Mexico, Turkey and 
Portugal. 
In Table 4, we identified the five largest institutional investments by OECD 
countries (in billion USD). The US economy has the largest share of institutional 
investment in the 1980’s and 1990’s, although other OECD economies like Japan and 
United Kingdom have increasing caught up over the years. The prominence of France 
and Italy’s especially in the 1990’s is largely due to the activities of the investment 
companies.  
 
Table 4: Top 5 OECD Institutional Investors in 1980, 1990 and 1999 (Billion  
               USD) 
Year Rank Country Financial Asset (Billion USD) 
    
1980 1 United States 1946.9 
 2 United Kingdom 271.6 
 3 Germany 151.5 
 4 Netherlands 120.7 
 5 France 72.1 
    
1990 1 United States 6572.2 
 2 Japan 2712 
 3 United Kingdom 1116.8 
 4 France 655.7 
 5 Netherlands 378.3 
    
1999 1 United States 19279 
 2 Japan 5039.8 
 3 United Kingdom 3264.8 
 4 France 1695.7 
 5 Italy 1104.4 
Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook (various years). 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the financial assets of various institutional investors in OECD 
countries. It is clear that the financial asset of pension funds has declined significantly 
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from around 35 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1999. Insurance companies have 
relatively maintained its share but there is a significant growth of investment 
companies which accounts for almost 31 percent of all financial assets of institutional 
investors in 1999.  













Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook (various years). 
 
We next examine the portfolio allocation of institutional investors in Figure 4. 
Generally, the financial assets of institutional investors are composed of bonds, loans, 
shares, foreign securities and other holdings (real estate, etc). Most institutional 
investors are either risk-adverse or are regulated by mandate to hold less risky assets 
as indicated by the large shareholdings of bonds. We could observe some clear trends 
in Figure 4. Firstly, the size of stock holdings has increased to around 30 percent in 
1999 from a base of 10 percent in 1980. Secondly, the increased in stock holdings 
appears to be at the expense of loan holdings. Another key observation is the small 
amount of foreign securities held by institutional investors that hardly reaches 1 
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percent of total portfolio holdings which indicates a significant biasness towards 
domestic financial assets. 



































Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook (various years). 
 
 
Table 5 shows the average portfolio of institutional investors in OECD 
countries. Institutional investors in Anglo-Saxon market based economies like United 
Kingdom and the US invest substantially in stocks. ‘Bank-based’ economies like 
Germany and to a lesser extent Japan have a large portion of its holdings in loans. 
France and Italy with its large share of investment companies, have a larger share of 
institutional holdings in bonds.  
Detailed examination of the portfolio holdings of pension funds, insurance 
companies and investment companies are presented in Figures 5, 6 and 7 respectively. 
These figures show that bonds holdings makes up the largest proportion of each 
institutional investor’s total portfolio representing 41 percent in pension funds, 45 
percent in insurance companies and 51 percent in investment companies. Stock 
holdings are the second most important component in institutional holdings with 
investment companies allocating the highest weightage of 28 percent. Furthermore, 
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while loans constitute an important portfolio holding in both pension funds and 
insurance companies, it is of lesser importance to investment companies. 
 
Table 5: Average Portfolio Holdings as a percentage of Total Financial Assets of  
   Institutional Investors in OECD Countries (1980–1999) 
  Bonds Loans Stock Others 
Australia 32 8 44 16 
Austria 45 30 6 19 
Belgium 52 15 21 12 
Canada 48 15 21 16 
Denmark 60 3 30 8 
Finland 21 61 16 2 
France 56 4 28 12 
Germany 40 45 11 4 
Greece 46 0 21 32 
Italy 69 1 17 13 
Japan 41 26 22 11 
Korea 38 34 10 18 
Luxembourg 25 39 6 30 
Mexico 58 8 20 14 
Netherlands 20 49 18 14 
Norway 42 30 13 15 
Portugal 77 1 6 17 
Spain 42 2 14 42 
Sweden 87 27 28 1 
Switzerland 48 17 26 9 
Turkey 70 1 10 18 
UK 19 2 65 15 
United States 41 15 32 12 
 Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook (various years). 












Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook. 
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Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook. 
 












Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook. 
 
The trends of financial assets of institutional investors (FA II), market 
capitalization of stock markets and domestic credit provided by the banking sector to 
GDP ratios are given in Figure 8. While the growth of domestic private credit 
provided by the banking sector has been relatively unchanged, both institutional 
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investors and stock market capitalization have experienced a large growth, 
particularly in the 1990’s. The high correlation between the financial assets of 
institutional investors and stock market capitalization in the 1990’s suggest a strong 
dynamic relationship between institutional investment and stock market activities. 
 






















































Source: OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook, World Development Indicators and the 














4.3.1 Dynamic PVAR 
 This study employs a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model to analyze 
the impact of institutional investors on financial sector development and economic 
growth. This model combines the traditional VAR approach21, which treats all the 
variables in the system as endogenous with the panel data approach, which controls 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity. More specifically, a dynamic tri-variate 



































































,,3, εϑηρβα   (3) 
 
where each equation is estimated separately. In this specification, ηi captures all 
unobserved country-specific time invariant effects and tϑ  is a full set of year 
dummies to account for trending behaviour and ti,ε  is the random error term which is 
                                                           
21 A VAR is a multivariate simultaneous equation system, in which each variable under study is 
regressed on a finite number of lags of all variables jointly considered. The VAR approach is useful 
when the intention is to analyze a phenomenon without having any strong priors about competing 
explanations of it. The method focuses on deriving a good statistical representation of the interaction 
between variables, letting the data determine the model. VAR models are nonstructural in the sense that 
they do not require any “incredible  restrictions” to identify the model but instead “estimate large scale 
macro models as unrestricted reduced forms, treating all variables as endogenous”  (Sims, 1980). By 
doing so, VAR models prevent a possible simultaneous-bias and allow feedback relations among the 
variables. Explicit here is the exclusion of the contemporaneous variables on the right hand side as the 
issue of causality is inherently determined by lags of the regressors. 
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assumed not to be correlated across countries and time. The variables Xit, Yit  and Zit 
are interchanged with the variables identified in Table 222.  
Given our short time period, we restricted the maximum lags to 2. In a PVAR 
model, the test on Granger causality is imposed on the respective lagged coefficients. 
For example, to test whether x Granger causes y in equation (1) requires a Wald test 
(chi-square test statistic with associated p-value) with the hypothesis of β1,1= β1,2= 0.  
Although, including lagged dependent variables in the panel enables the 
examination of the dynamics between the variables in study, Nickell (1981) 23 showed 
that this leads to biased estimation especially if the time dimension of the panel is 
relatively short, like in this study. To improve the estimation, Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981) first proposed a two-step instrumental variable (IV) procedure that includes 
first differencing the dynamic panel and instrumenting the difference equation with 
the lagged level or lagged difference24 of the dependent variable, which are 
uncorrelated with the disturbance in the difference equation but not correlated with 
the difference dependent variable. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) implemented this 
Anderson and Hsiao approach in a PVAR model. The variables in equations (1), (2) 
and (3) are subjected to first differencing which eliminates the country-specific fixed 
effect that is likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables.  
 
 
                                                           
22 For example in examining the impact of institutional investor (IINVEST) on stock market 
capitalization (MC) after controlling for banking effects (BANK) in equation 1, the y-variable 
represents MC, x represents IINVEST and z represents BANK. The dynamics of reverse causality is 
further examined in the specification of equation 2 and 3 respectively.  
23 The usual approach to estimating fixed effects models is by employing the least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) estimator which tends to generate a biased estimate of the coefficients. Nickell (1981) 
derives an expression for this bias when there are no exogenous regressors, showing that the bias 
approaches zero as T approaches infinity. Judson and Owen (1997) showed that this bias can be as 
much as 20 percent even as T approached 30. 
24 Arellano (1989) shows that using the lagged difference as an instrument results in an estimator that 
has a very large variance. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Kiviet (1995) further confirm the superiority 
of using the lagged level as an instrument with simulation results. 
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,,3, εϑρβα  (6)  
where 1,,,, −−=∆= titititi yyyy  
 1,,,, −−=∆= titititi xxxx  
and 1,,,, −−=∆= titititi zzzz  
 
4.3.2 Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM)  
The IV estimation as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) does not 
necessarily yield efficient estimates of the model as it does not make use of all the 
available moment conditions and it also does not take into account the differenced 
structure of the new error terms. Hence we employed Arellano and Bond’s (1991) 
GMM estimation procedure which have negligible finite sample biases and is more 
efficient than Anderson and Hsiao’s (1981) IV estimator25. More specifically, the 
GMM estimation procedure is employed to deal with two issues key in panel 
estimation. First, the endogeneity or non –orthogonality of the regressors in equations 
(4), (5) and (6), which is reflected in the correlation between these variables and the 
error term. Secondly, the new differenced error term, is by construction correlated 
with the lagged dependent variables. The advantage of the GMM estimation 
procedure is that it employs additional linear instrumental variables which uses 
                                                           
25 Arellano and Bond (1991) run a Monte Carlo experiment to judge the Anderson-Hsiao estimator 
against various GMM estimators and find that the GMM procedures produce substantial efficiency 
gains. 
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predetermined lagged level as instruments to exploit a potentially large set of 
overidentifying restrictions to deliver consistent coefficient estimates. Generally the 
following moment conditions are applied: 
0)].([ 1 =− −− ititjitYE εε   for j ≥ 2 
0)].([ 1 =− −− ititjitXE εε  for j ≥ 2    - (7) 
Using these moment conditions, we employed a ‘restricted GMM’ estimation 
procedure as only appropriate and current lagged values are selected as valid 
instruments. This is because Hsiao (2003: pp.90) found that while it is theoretically 
possible to add additional moment conditions to improve the asymptotic efficiency of 
the GMM estimation, it is doubtful how much efficiency gain can be achieved by 
using a huge number of moment conditions in a finite sample. Furthermore, if higher 
moment conditions are used, the estimator can be very sensitive to outlying 
observations. For example, Ziliak’s (1997) simulation finds that the downward bias in 
GMM is quite severe as the number of moment conditions expands, outweighing the 
efficiency gains26. 
 
4.3.3 GMM Procedural Steps 
Arrellano and Bond (1991) proposed two GMM estimators to estimate a 
dynamic panel, namely the one-step and the two-step estimator. Generally, in the one-
step estimation, the error terms are assumed to be independent and homoskedastic 
across countries and over time. This assumption corresponds to a specific weighting 
matrix that is used to produce one-step coefficient estimates. On the other hand, the 
                                                           
26 Further usage of additional instruments like the lag of the first difference of the dependent and 
explanatory variables for the regression in levels as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) are not 
employed extensively due to the short panel. The extended GMM estimator; more frequently known as 
the system GMM estimator uses moment conditions well in excess of the number of unknown 
parameters and can therefore be subjected to important small sample bias.  
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two-step estimator employs the residuals obtained in the one-step estimator to 
construct a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix, which is then used 
to re-estimate the parameters.  
Bond (2002) and Bond and Windmeijer (2002) outlined the applicability of 
the one-step estimator in applied work due to the fact that the one-step estimator 
produces less biased and more efficient estimates that the two-step alternative. They 
attribute this to the ‘dependence of the two-step weight matrix on estimated 
parameters that makes the usual asymptotic distribution approximations less reliable’. 
The downward bias of the two-step GMM estimator is further confirmed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Monte Carlo studies have also 
shown that the asymptotic standard errors tend to be much too small, or the 
asymptotic t-statistics much too big for the two-step estimator, in sample sizes where 
the equivalent tests based on the one-step estimator are quite accurate (Bond and 
Windmeijer, 2002). This tendency is exaggerated when the errors are non-normal or 
heteroskedastic (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Hence in our study, we used one-step 
GMM estimator.   
 
4.3.4 Specification Tests 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends firstly on whether lagged 
values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the model outlined above 
and secondly if the assumption of no serial correlation in the errors holds. The 
specification test for the former involves the utilization of the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing 
the moment conditions used in the estimation process (see Sargan 1958, 1988). 
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Failure to reject the null hypothesis that the moment conditions are valid gives 
support to the model.  
The second test examines the assumption of no serial correlation in the error 
term, ei,t by testing whether the differenced error term are second order serially 
correlated. This is necessarily pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991) as ‘an 
estimator that uses lags as instruments under the assumption of white noise errors 
would lose its consistency if in fact the errors were serially correlated’. Basically, this 
test is conducted by examining whether the differenced error term is first- and second-
order serially correlated. By construction the difference error term is likely to be first-
order serially correlated even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated. 
Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original 
error term is serially correlated and follows a moving average process at least of order 
one. If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of absence of second-order serial 
correlation, we conclude that the original error term is serially uncorrelated which 
gives support to the model. 
Having outlined the necessary procedural methodology, the next chapter 










Chapter 5: Results on the Causal Relationship Between  
Economic Growth, Financial Sector Development 
and Institutional Investors in PVAR Framework 
  
In this chapter, we will empirically analyze Granger causality between 
institutional investors, financial sector development and economic growth. 
Specifically, these causality issues are categorically analyzed at both the aggregated 
(institutional investors as a group) and disaggregated (individual institutional 
investors) levels respectively. Firstly we examine the aggregated impact of 
institutional investor directly on the development of financial institutions consisting of 
banks and stock market. Subsequently, we examine the existence of direct aggregated 
effects of institutional investors on economic growth. The robustness of these results 
is examined by employing different model specifications. Secondly, we studied the 
independent effects of pension funds, insurance companies and investment companies 
on both financial sector development and economic growth.   
  
5.1 Institutional Investors, Financial Sector Development and Economic 
Growth 
 
5.1.1 Institutional Investors (Aggregated) and Financial Sector Development 
Table 6 outlines a basic tri-variate PVAR model that examines the dynamic 
relationship between institutional investors, banking sector and various stock market 
indicators accordingly. The key finding of this study is that there is a strong causal 
impact of institutional investors in OECD countries on the development of various 
aspects to the stock market characteristics. From Table 6, we find that institutional 
investment significantly Granger causes stock market capitalization, the value of 
stock traded and turnover ratio. This finding is in line with earlier studies by 
Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2001, 2003). However, as compared to our study,  
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Table 6: Tri-variate model of Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for OECD 
countries with Institutional Investors and Financial Sector indicators in a GMM-
DIFF estimation framework 
Model Effect (→) 
Cause (↓) 
∆IINVEST t ∆ Stock t ∆ DC t 
 
1 F-∆IINVEST t -  0.0000 ***  0.5967 
 F-∆MC t  0.0225 ** -  0.0865 
 F-∆DC t  0.3135  0.1703 - 
     
2 F-∆IINVEST t -  0.0000 ***  0.6852 
 F-∆VT t  0.5088 -  0.0480 ** 
 F-∆DC t  0.2134  0.7079 - 
     
3 F-∆IINVEST t -  0.0017 ***  0.6511 
 F-∆TR t  0.9883 -  0.6934 
 F-∆DC t  0.8353  0.5001 - 
     
Note:  
1) *, ** and *** denotes p-value Wald/ F-test rejection of Granger non-causality at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. 
2) Two specification tests ensure validity of the model. Firstly, the Sargan test (p-value) of the 
overidentiying restriction employs the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated 
with the residuals. Secondly, for serial correlation, the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-
difference regression exhibit either no first-order or second order serial correlation. Specification 
tests of no second order serial correlation in the differenced error term and non-rejection of the 
Sargan test supports the findings (unless stated otherwise). 
3) Time dummies and intercept are included in the estimation but are not reported. 
4) See appendix Table A4 for a detailed result. 
 
the previous studies focused solely on the impact of ‘contractual savings’ institutions 
which only consists of pension funds and insurance companies. We also find some 
evidence of reverse causality, but this feedback is only apparent from the market 
capitalization rather than the liquidity or turnover of the stock market. There is also no 
causality either from institutional investors to the banking sector or banking to 
institutional investors. This is intuitive as we have seen from Figure 4, the proportion 
of bank loans in the portfolio of institutional investors have decreased over time. As 
the banking variable is defined as the amount of domestic bank loans to the private 
sector, the shrinking share of bank loans in the portfolios of institutional investors 
validates the insignificant relationship between banks and institutional investors. 
Besides this, there is a diminishing trend in the banking sector’s traditional function in 
providing loans and accepting deposits. Hence, the growth of institutional investors 
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would directly erode the traditional role of the banking sector which is essentially 
captured by the ‘DC’ variable. With increasing competition on the traditional interest 
income operations, the banking system has gradually ventured into the premise of 
institutional investors core activities as evident by the growing importance of non-
interest income in the balance sheets of banks. The LOMA report by Crooks Gora 
(1997) outlined the growing importance of bancassurance27 in the US and Canada. 
Although we are unable to quantify this effect from our data sample, the definition of 
the banking variable given in our study would serve to highlight the effect of 
institutional investors in the ‘core’ activities of the banking development and 
soundness.  
 
5.1.2 Institutional Investors (Aggregated) and Economic Growth 
In Table 7, we extended the analysis by incorporating the possible direct 
growth impact from the development of institutional investors. The key result 
supports our hypothesis that institutional investors have a significant direct causal 
impact on GDP, even after accounting for various financial market indicators. It is 
apparent that the channel of transmission is through the stock market as opposed to 
the banking sector as indicated by models 5, 6 and 7 in Table 7. This direct impact on 
GDP is statistically significant at the 5 percent level when market capitalization is 
employed, while it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level when both stock 
traded and turnover ratio are used. Furthermore, the direct impact of institutional 
investors on GDP is uni-directional with no feedback effect from GDP to institutional 
investors.  
                                                           
27 Bancassurance is the strategy of a bank to cross-sell insurance products through its own distribution 
channels, usually branches. 
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Whilst we have accounted for the direct impact of institutional investors on 
GDP, the impact of institutional investors on various financial indicators remains 
consistent to the earlier findings. For example, we found no effect of institutional 
investors on the banking sector. This result is similar to the one which we found 
earlier in Table 6. The high statistical significance (1 percent) of institutional 
investors is apparent when we employ the three different stock market indicators: 
stock market capitalization, stock traded and turnover ratio. While there is only uni-
directional causality for the last two stock market indicators, again we found a bi-
directional causality when market capitalization is employed. This suggests that 
institutional investors not only Granger causes market capitalization, but the 
successful development of institutional investors also requires a threshold size of the 
stock market. This is illustrative as it shows that size rather than liquidity is the main 
criterion for the development of institutional investors. 
 
Table 7: Tri-variate model of Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for OECD 
countries with Gross Domestic Product, Institutional Investors and Financial 
Sector indicators in a GMM-DIFF estimation framework 
Model Effect (→) 
Cause (↓) 
∆IINVEST t ∆GDP t ∆ Financial Sector t 
4 F-∆IINVEST t - 0.2038 0.2049 
 F-∆GDP t 0.6715 - 0.0434 ** 
 F-∆DC t 0.9648 0.0000 *** - 
     
5 F-∆IINVEST t - 0.0328 ** 0.0000 ** 
 F-∆GDP t 0.7774 - 0.0257 ** 
 F-∆MC t 0.0718* 0.0973* - 
     
6 F-∆IINVEST t - 0.0096 *** 0.0000 *** 
 F-∆GDP t 0.9101 - 0.0440 ** 
 F-∆VT t 0.6555 0.1633 - 
     
7 F-∆IINVEST t - 0.0093 *** 0.0017 *** 
 F-∆GDP t 0.5066 - 0.0501* 
 F-∆TR t 0.5801 0.0192 ** - 
     
Note: Reported values are probability of rejection of Granger non-causality See Table 6 notes for more 
details. Appendix Table A5 provides a detailed estimation result.  
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In Table 8, we employed a four-variable difference PVAR model that 
combines together GDP, the aggregated financial assets of institutional investors, 
banking sector, and various stock market indicators interchangeably. There is 
evidence of institutional investment spurring economic growth in most of the 
frameworks with the slight exception of model 10 (the TR-framework). Furthermore, 
there is no evidence of reverse causality from GDP to institutional investors, which is 
consistent with our earlier findings. 
Table 8: Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for OECD countries with Gross 
Domestic Product, Institutional Investors, Banks and various Stock Market 
indicators in a GMM-DIFF estimation framework. 
Model Effect (→) 
Cause (↓) 
∆IINVEST t ∆GDP t ∆DC t ∆STOCK t 
 
8 F-∆IINVEST t -  0.0537 *  0.3668  0.0000 *** 
 F-∆GDP t  0.6626 -  0.0250 **  0.0010 *** 
 F-∆DC t  0.4712  0.0006 *** -  0.1275 
 F-∆MC t  0.0244 **  0.2029  0.2329 - 
      
9 F-∆IINVEST t -  0.0448 **  0.3969  0.0000 *** 
 F-∆GDP t  0.5888 -  0.0512 *  0.0640 * 
 F-∆DC t  0.8820  0.0000 *** -  0.6196 
 F-∆VT t  0.4758  0.1449  0.2832 - 
      
10 F-∆IINVEST t -  0.1043  0.3614  0.0160 ** 
 F-∆GDP t  0.4941 -  0.0375 **  0.0606 * 
 F-∆DC t  0.9473  0.0000 *** -  0.4006 
 F-∆TR t  0.5530  0.1218  0.7575 - 
      
Note: Reported values are probability of rejection of Granger non-causality. See Table 6 notes for more 
details. Appendix Table A6 provides a detailed estimation result. 
 
 
We next examined the dynamics of institutional investor participation in the 
development of the financial sectors. We found that the activities of institutional 
investor participation lead to the growth of securities market as indicated by the 
significance of all the stock market variables. More specifically, institutional 
investment enhances the growth in stock market capitalization, value traded and 
turnover; with a more significant effect on the former two indicators. Again no 
feedback effect was found with the exception of model 8 (market capitalization, MC 
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framework). Furthermore we again confirm that there seems to be no causal effect 
between institutional investors and the banking sector. 
In summary, various model specifications show consistently that at the 
aggregate level, institutional investors collectively Granger causes stock market 
development and economic growth. There is no evidence of reverse causality from 
economic growth to institutional investor growth but we do find among the three 
stock market indicators, only stock market capitalization Granger causes institutional 
investors. This is an interesting observation as even in industrialized OECD countries, 
size of the stock market is more important than both liquidity and turnover in Granger 
causing institutional investor growth. We also attribute this to the nature of 
institutional investors in selectively preferring large market capitalized companies. 
Finally we find no evidence of causality between institutional investors and the 
banking sector.      
 
5.2 Pension Funds, Insurance Companies and Investment Companies 
The previous estimations have examined the impact of institutional investors 
at the aggregate level. We extend this analysis to examine the independent impact of 
pension funds, insurance and investment companies on financial sector development 
and economic growth. Studies in this area have focused on the impact of ‘contractual 
savings’ (pension funds and life insurance companies; usually focusing predominantly 
on the former, while omitting investment companies all together) institutions on 
financial markets. Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2003) employed a multivariate 
panel estimation method in examining the dynamic relationship between contractual 
savings institutions with banking and securities markets respectively. They 
hypothesized that the ‘captive’ nature of contractual institutions would lengthen the 
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duration of investments and liabilities while investment companies, especially open-
end investment companies generally have a shorter-term outlook. According to them, 
‘contractual savings institutions have a natural advantage over open-ended investment 
companies in financing long-term investment projects and their investment strategies 
will be more biased towards long-term bonds and the equity markets’(Impavido, 
Musalem and Tressel, 2003). Gooptu (1993) also acknowledges that in contrast to 
investment companies, who switch rapidly in search of short-run returns, pension 
funds and life insurance companies could be taken as a risk-adverse group interested 
in participating in long-term investment. However the rapid growth of investment 
companies as indicated by Figure 3 coupled with the ‘open-endedness’28 
characteristics of some contractual savings institutions (like the 401(k) pension plans 
in the US whereby contributors are left to decide their asset allocation) warrants the 
aggregated study of institutional investors as carried out earlier in section 5.1.  
 
5.2.1 Institutional Investors (Disaggregated) and Financial Sector  
   Development 
 
A disaggregated preliminary empirical study was undertaken by Catalan, 
Impavido and Musalem (2000)29 for a group of developed and developing countries. 
Using bi-variate VAR, they examined the interaction of pension funds, life insurance 
and non-life insurance companies with two securities market indicators: market 
capitalization and value traded. Whilst confirming the direction of causality from 
contractual savings institutions to promoting the development of market capitalization 
                                                           
28 According to Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2003), ‘although open pension funds (as opposed to 
closed pension funds, which are employer-sponsored plans) operate like open-end investment 
companies, their funds are more stable because they are captive to the industry as a whole. Hence, open 
pension funds are less exposed to systemic risks than are open-end investment companies.’ 
29 A limitation of this study is the focus on the analysis of impact of contractual savings institutions on 
securities market only. 
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as opposed to value traded30, a key finding of their paper is the stronger causality 
impact of this activity in developing countries. For example, they found that in the 
USA, there is no evidence of either uni-directional or bi-directional causality between 
contractual savings institutions and stock markets. They attributed this finding to the 
dilution of the illiquidity effect of contractual savings institutions in countries with 
well developed financial markets. ‘In those countries, we expect reciprocal and 
weaker effects between both variables’ (Catalan, Impavido and Musalem, 2000).  
In the study of institutional investors at the disaggregated level, we provide a 
‘common’ benchmark on how our results compare to these earlier studies after 
accounting for both banking and securities market development and further extending 
this to examine its growth implications. The following two tables: Tables 9 and 10 are 
analogous to Tables 6 and 7 with the difference being the separation of the aggregated 
institutional investor’s variable into its subcomponents consisting of pension funds, 
insurance companies and investment companies.  
As compared to the aggregated models earlier that showed institutional 
investors collectively Granger causes depth, liquidity and efficiency of the stock 
market, independent study in Table 9 suggest that this impact is driven mainly by 
investment company activities only. While Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2003) 
found that contractual savings institutions have a positive impact on stock market 
depth (market capitalization) and no significant impact on liquidity (value traded), we 
found that at the disaggregated level, both pension funds and insurance companies 
have significant impact on value traded and turnover ratio respectively. Individually,  
                                                           
30 Impavido and Musalem (2000) accepted the direction of causality from contractual savings to capital 
markets. Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2003) further confirms this, while finding that this impact is 
(a) ‘non linear’ in countries with a higher degree of transparency, (b) robust to the overall level of 
development, education, demographic structure and legal environment, and (c) heterogeneous among 
countries that have a market based financial system, mandatory pension contributions and lower 
international securities transactions.   
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Table 9: Tri-variable model of Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for OECD 
countries with Individual Institutional Investors (Pension, Insurance and 
Investment) Banks and Stock Market Capitalization in a GMM-DIFF estimation 
framework 




∆ MC t ∆DC t 
11 F-IINVEST t (Pen) -  0.1677  0.9653 
 F-∆MC t  0.0119 ** -  0.9260 
 F-∆DC t  0.0001 ***  0.0050 *** - 
     
12 F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins) -  0.2032  0.9996 
 F-∆MC t  0.0774 * -  0.0776 * 
 F-∆DC t  0.8934  0.2584 - 
     
13 F-∆IINVEST t (Invt) -  0.0161 **  0.0487 ** 
 F-∆MC t  0.9804 -  0.1522 
 F-∆DC t  0.2470  0.1367 - 
     
  ∆IINVEST t 
(various) 
∆ VT t ∆DC t 
14 F-∆IINVEST t (Pen) - 0.0963 * 0.8957 
 F-∆VT t 0.0377 ** - 0.9147 
 F-∆DC t 0.0402 ** 0.1067 - 
     
15 F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins) - 0.1202 0.9921 
 F-∆VT t 0.2968 - 0.0435 ** 
 F-∆DC t 0.6975 0.7416 - 
     
16 F-∆IINVEST t (Invt) - 0.0068 *** 0.0503 * 
 F-∆VT t 0.6199 - 0.0919 * 
 F-∆DC t 0.2120 0.5128 - 
     
  ∆IINVEST t 
(various) 
∆ TR t ∆DC t 
17 F-∆IINVEST t (Pen) - 0.1237 0.7546 
 F-∆TR t 0.4867 - 0.7116 
 F-∆DC t 0.0991 * 0.3718 - 
     
18 F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins) - 0.0072 *** 0.9773 
 F-∆TR t 0.2681 - 0.5622 
 F-∆DC t 0.8112 0.5242 - 
     
19 F-∆IINVEST t (Invt) - 0.0076 *** 0.0730 * 
 F-∆TR t 0.4213 - 0.5133 
 F-∆DC t 0.2577 0.3846 - 
     
Note: Reported values are probability of rejection of Granger non-causality. See Table 6 notes for more 
details. Appendix Table A7 provides a detailed estimation result. 
 
both pension funds and insurance companies do not have significant impact on market 
capitalization, but we do find evidence of Granger causality from investment 
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companies to market capitalization. This result differs from the findings of Impavido, 
Musalem and Tressel (2003). On a more conciliatory finding, Holzmann (1997) 
hypothesized that pension funds increases both the liquidity and market capitalization 
for the Argentinean economy31. ‘The general hypothesis is that the rising investment 
needs of the pension funds, the instruments thereby created and the competitive setup 
of the privately managed pension funds made the financial markets deeper, more 
liquid and more competitive’ (Holzmann 1997). However Holzmann’s findings are 
based on ordinary least squared time series estimation for a developing country, 
Argentina. Our seemingly contradictory evidence that contractual savings institution 
leads value traded (liquidity) and turnover ratio (efficiency) also dislodges the popular 
notion that these contractual savings institutions, especially pension funds, follow 
adherently to the ‘buy and hold’ strategy. One could reasonably argue that this higher 
turnover of equities provides scant evidence either of short-terminism on the part of 
these contractual savings institutions or performance mandate increasingly focused on 
quarterly reporting. Furthermore the growing amount of funds channelled from 
‘contractual saving institutions’ to both internally established and externally managed 
investment companies helps explain the importance of investment companies in the 
development of the stock market. In general, we believe that the need for liquidity is 
the overriding factor not only for investment companies, but increasingly so for both 
pension funds and insurance companies. For example in a study of large institutional 
investors based in US, Gompers and Metrick (1998) finds that these institutional 
investors prefers to invest in large, liquid stock with relatively good market value 
(high book-to market ratios) and low past returns. As these four factors are analysed 
                                                           
31 Holzmann also shows that pension reforms in Chile augments economic growth via Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) and capital formation though this robust relationship does not exist for private 
savings. 
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collectively with no individual ranking of importance, further work on the trading 
strategies of each institutional investors is needed to verify our findings. 
On the other hand, the result in Table 9 shows sufficient evidence of feedback 
from stock market development to both pension funds and insurance companies. More 
specifically, a large and liquid stock market Granger causes pension funds. Davis 
(1995) states: “Experience, suggests that the successful development of pension funds 
requires a certain prior level of development of the financial sector.” Thus, the 
direction of causality, as derived from the Table 9 suggests the relationship from 
market capitalization and value traded to contractual savings institutions. This is 
because “the implementation of some active and sophisticated financial strategies 
require very frequent trading and given the large volume of funds managed by 
pension funds, the price volatility implied by these strategies would be too high if the 
stock market is not liquid enough” (Catalan, Impavido and Musalem, 2000).  
Thus far, we have discussed the impact of individual institutional investors on 
stock market development only. As opposed to earlier results, at the disaggregated 
level, we find some interesting results. Whilst contractual savings institutional have 
no impact on the banking sector, only investment companies Granger causes banking 
sector development. This highlights the need for a robust banking sector in allowing 
investment companies to carry out their trading and investment strategies which will 
be developed later in Table 11. 
 
5.2.2 Institutional Investors (Disaggregated) and Economic Growth 
The result of the impact of institutional investors on economic growth is given 
in Table 10. The growth impact found earlier at the aggregated level of institutional 
investor is present consistently at each individual institutional investor sub-section  
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Table 10: Tri-variate model of Granger Causality Test (Wald Test) for OECD 
countries with Gross Domestic Product, Individual Institutional Investors 
(Pension, Insurance and Investment) and Financial Sector indicators in a GMM-
DIFF estimation framework 




∆ GDP t ∆DC t 
20 ∆IINVEST t (Pen) - 0.0000 *** 0.5867 
 F-∆GDP t 0.3550 - 0.7237 
 F-∆DC t 0.0276 * 0.0666 * - 
21 F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins) - 0.0596 * 0.7446 
 F-∆GDP t 0.5277 - 0.2204 
 F-∆DC t 0.8465 0.0002 *** - 
22 ∆IINVEST t (Invt) - 0.0685 * 0.5236 
 F-∆GDP t 0.0765 * - 0.2758 
 F-∆DC t 0.2287 0.0204 ** - 
     
  ∆IINVEST t 
(various) 
∆ GDP t ∆MC t 
23 ∆IINVEST t (Pen) - 0.0001 *** 0.4283 
 F-∆GDP t 0.0002 *** - 0.1192 
 F-∆MC t 0.0020 *** 0.0077 *** - 
24 F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins) - 0.0978 * 0.1897 
 F-∆GDP t 0.5857 - 0.0010 *** 
 F-∆MC t 0.0915* 0.0791 * - 
25 ∆IINVEST t (Invt) - 0.0066 *** 0.0303 ** 
 F-∆GDP t 0.1040 - 0.0400 ** 
 F-∆MC t 0.9998 0.1318 - 
     
  ∆IINVEST t 
(various) 
∆ GDP t ∆VT t 
26 ∆IINVEST t (Pen) - 0.0000 *** 0.2183 
 F-∆GDP t 0.7299 - 0.0183 ** 
 F-∆VT t 0.0918* 0.6268 - 
27 F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins) - 0.0181 ** 0.2018 
 F-∆GDP t 0.4281 - 0.0838 * 
 F-∆VT t 0.3277 0.0972 * - 
28 ∆IINVEST t (Invt) - 0.001 *** 0.0010 *** 
 F-∆GDP t 0.0978 * - 0.0000 *** 
 F-∆VT t 0.5069 0.4244 - 
     
  ∆IINVEST t 
(various) 
∆ GDP t ∆TR t 
29 ∆IINVEST t (Pen) - 0.0000 *** 0.1389 
 F-∆GDP t 0.7013 - 0.0549 
 F-∆TR t 0.7452 0.0553 * - 
30 F-∆IINVEST t  (Ins) - 0.0787 8 * 0.0193 ** 
 F-∆GDP t 0.5924 - 0.1326 
 F-∆TR t 0.3656 0.0103 ** - 
31 ∆IINVEST t (Invt) - 0.0055 *** 0.0927 * 
 F-∆GDP t 0.0310 ** - 0.0009 *** 
 F-∆TR t 0.3376 0.0696 * - 
     
Note: Reported values are probability of rejection of Granger non-causality. See Table 6 notes for more 
details. Appendix Table A8 provides a detailed estimation result. 
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also. More specifically, in our PVAR study, we find that pension fund, insurance 
companies and investment companies Granger causes economic growth.  
While economic growth and pension funds nexus has been extensively 
developed, that of the insurance firms and especially for investment companies is a 
fairly recent development and the very focus of this study. Outrevillle (1990, 1996) 
pioneered the examination of the relationship between insurance development and 
economic growth. His findings indicated that both non-life (Outrevillle, 1990) and life 
(Outrevillle, 1996) insurance companies Granger causes economic growth. However, 
Outreville’s cross sectional study is limited to developing countries and thus may not 
be directly applicable to OECD countries. Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) furthered 
Outreville’s study by employing a time series Vector Error Correction Model (VEC) 
for nine OECD countries. Their main hypothesis is that the heterogeneity in causal 
size and direction between insurance company development and economic growth 
that differs across countries are due cultural, regulatory and legal environment. 
Interestingly they found no causality in either direction especially in US and UK, 
which they mainly attributed to the high measures of insurance density in these 
countries. According to them, ‘this is because the importance of insurance to an 
economic growth is not necessarily in its levels of activity, rather its significance is 
derived from the rate of structural change in an economy that results from an increase 
in level of insurance provision’  (Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000).  
We extended Ward and Zurbruegg’s study by incorporating both a panel 
framework and allowing for financial sector dynamics. After allowing for a different 
estimation method and specification, we found that on aggregate, insurance 
companies in OECD countries Granger causes economic growth. This shows that 
although insurance density of OECD countries are high, the role of insurance 
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companies in Granger causing economic growth as hypothesized earlier is still 
significant. 
With regards to the investment companies and economic growth nexus, to our 
knowledge, this study is the first attempt at confirming causality from investment 
companies to economic growth in a panel framework. Meanwhile, the feedback 
impact from institutional investors to economic growth is only apparent for 
investment companies, suggesting a dynamic interaction between economic growth 
and the growth of investment companies. The combined uni-directional effect of 
pension fund and insurance companies in Granger causing economic growth seem to 
outweigh the bi-directional effect of investment companies at the aggregate level 
found earlier in Section 5.1. We attribute this to the ‘contractual’ savings nature of 
both pension fund and insurance companies. On the other hand, contributions to 
investment companies are voluntary and thus as economic growth increases 
disposable income, more household are able to allocate funds voluntarily to these 
investment companies, hence verifying a dynamic interaction between investment 
companies and economic growth. 
 
5.2.3 Summary: Causality between Pension Fund, Insurance Companies, 
Investment Companies and Financial Sector Development 
 
As compared to section 5.2.1, this section summarizes the impact of each 
individual institutional investor on financial sector development, with and without 
accounting for direct growth effects. The dynamics of institutional investors with the 
financial sector; banking and stock market is summarized in Tables 11 and 12 
respectively. Table 11 summarizes Granger causality tests from Tables 8 (part a) and 
9 (part b) on the impact of individual institutional investors on the banking sector’s 
core activities.  
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Table 11: Granger Causality Test of Pension Fund, Insurance Companies and 
Investment Companies on Banking Sector Core Activities: Summary 
  DC 
  → ← ↔ <> 
a) Pension   √   
 Insurance     √ 
 Investment  √    
      
b) Pension   √   
 Insurance     √ 
 Investment     √ 
      
Note: The first column in each quadrant (→) reports Granger causality from one of the individual  
institutional investor (pension funds, insurance companies, investment companies) to the financial 
market indicators; the second column reports reverse causality(←); the third column reports bi-
directional causality (↔); and the fourth column reports no evidence of causality (<>). 
 
 
From the Table 11, we found evidence that only investment companies 
Granger causes banking sector’s core activities (i.e. provision of loans and deposits). 
This is perhaps caused by the shorter-term outlook of investment companies 
(especially open-ended investment companies as pointed out by Impavido, Musalem 
and Tressel, 2003), thus necessitating a higher degree of liquidity which corresponds 
to a higher weightage placed on bank loans and advances. However, once we account 
for possible growth effects, the uni-directional causality dissipates (part b) 
There is however, stronger evidence of reverse causality from banking sector 
development to pension funds. More specifically, we consistently find in both models 
(especially in Table 10, as the banking sector indicators is interacted with different 
stock market indicators) that there exists only a uni-directional causality running from 
the banking sector to pension funds. Chile’s 1981 pension reform (from an unfunded 
social security system to a private defined benefit system) serves to illustrate this 
finding. In the early stages of Chile’s pension reform period, credibility of the new 
pension funds was necessary and as a result, pension funds were required to hold 
more liquid and less risky assets. ‘Initially, funds were invested mainly in debt 
securities, owing to regulatory prohibition of equity investment, but they did not 
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invest solely in government paper; they also accumulated bank certificates of deposits 
(CDs) and mortgage bonds’ (Davis and Steil, 2001, pp.231). Clearly, the existence of 
a mature and developed banking sector enabled the further development of pension 
funds. On the other hand, we do no find any causality between insurance companies 
and the banking sector. In short, we only found that investment companies lead the 
banking sector; there is only feedback effect to pension funds while insurance 
companies exhibit no evidence of causality. As a result, it would not be too surprising 
that at the aggregate level, with the combined effect of pension fund and insurance 
companies we found collectively that institutional investors do not lead banking 
sector development. 
These results are indeed a first attempt at assessing the impact of each 
individual institutional investor’s on the ‘core’ activities of the banking sector. 
Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2002b)32 provides a different approach by analyzing 
the impact of contractual savings institutions on specific banking sector characteristics 
like interest spread, profitability, loan maturity, credit risk and liquidity risk. They 
found that the development of contractual savings institutions is associated with 
increased efficiency of the banking system (through the increased competitive 
pressures on the banking sector that reduces the spreads between loan and deposit 
rates; and enhances bank profitability, which is derived mainly from a reduction in 
credit risk) combined with greater resilience to credit and liquidity risks 33. This 
methodology differs from our study, but provides preliminary evidence that the 
                                                           
32 They utilized panel data estimates (General Least Squares, GLS without and with fixed effects) in 
assessing the impact of contractual savings on banking sector stability and efficiency after controlling 
for banks characteristics; financial sector development and macroeconomic environment. 
33 This result complements the conclusions of Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2002a) that show that 
the corporate sector is more resilient to various shocks when contractual savings institutions are more 
developed or invest more on the stock exchange. 
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banking sector is ‘not static’ and its progressive move into non-interest based 
activities compliments the development of institutional investors.  
 
Table 12: Granger Causality Test of Pension Fund, Insurance Companies and 
Investment Companies on Stock Market: Summary 
  MC VT TR 
  → ← ↔ <> → ← ↔ <> → ← ↔ <> 
a) Pension  √     √     √ 
 Insurance  √      √ √    
 Investment √    √    √    
              
b) Pension  √    √      √ 
 Insurance  √      √ √    
 Investment √    √    √    
              
Note: The first column in each quadrant (→) reports Granger causality from one of the individual 
institutional investor (pension funds, insurance companies, investment companies) to the financial 
market indicators; the second column reports reverse causality(←); the third column reports bi-
directional causality (↔); and the fourth column reports no evidence of causality (<>). 
 
 
Table 12 summarizes Granger causality tests from Table 9 (part a) and Table 
10 (part b) on the impact of individual institutional investors on the stock market 
capitalization, value traded and turnover ratio. There is significant evidence of 
consistency in the direction of causality from these two frameworks. It shows that 
either causality between institutional investors and stock market does not exist, or if it 
exists, it is predominantly from institutional investors to stock market only. This is 
mainly driven by the activities of investment companies. Hence an important 
contribution of this study is to call upon policy makers to devise a coherent policy 
framework to spur the development of investment companies’ vis-à-vis contractual 
savings institutions. Besides that, evidence of reverse causality points out to the 
importance of stock market capitalization to the development of pension funds and 
insurance companies. To a lesser extent, causality simultaneously exists in the two 
directions between institutional investors and stock market, though this is only 
reported in the pension fund–value traded framework. 
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Chapter 6: Policy Prescriptions and Concluding Remarks 
 
The phenomenal growth of institutional investor has lead to the growing 
ownership of the financial sector by institutional investors. We have found 
collectively that these institutional investors have enhanced the growth of the stock 
markets at the expense of the loans advancements and deposit taking function of the 
banking sector. Overall the Granger causality of institutional investor growth to the 
financial sector has spilled over either directly or indirectly to economic growth. 
Similar causality issues are examined for each segment of institutional investors; 
pension funds, insurance companies, and investment companies. As hypothesized, 
causality varies along these different types of institutional investors. We found the 
development of the stock market, in particular market capitalization Granger causes 
the development of contractual savings institutions that consist of pension funds and 
insurance companies. While this reverse causality finding is contrary to studies done 
at the developing country level, at the OECD level, we believe the maturity and large 
coverage of these contractual savings institutions dilutes the impact in deepening the 
stock market. However, we do find evidence that these contractual savings institutions 
do lead various aspects of stock market liquidity. In addition, we do find that banking 
sector development does help pension fund growth, reflecting its risk-adverse nature 
in portfolio investment. Another key finding of this study is the significant role of 
investment companies in Granger causing both banking and stock market 
development, with no evidence of reverse causality. 
Hence in fostering further institutional growth, we propose that the regulation 
and supervision be conducted at the functional level, congruent to Merton and Bodie’s 
(1995) functional view of the financial sector. While regulation inevitably takes place 
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within an institutional context, it must focus as closely as possible on the 
organizational structure, investment conduct (choice between quantitative34 or 
prudent man rule35), and consumer protection. Regulation is only as good as 
necessary supervisory tools (enforcing legislation, transparent and reliable accounting, 
auditing and actuarial reporting and good corporate governance practices) are needed 
to ensure check and balances.  
The regulation and supervision of institutional investors at the functional level 
does not necessarily imply that pension funds, insurance companies and investment 
companies should be treated equally, but rather their differing objectives and 
responsibilities has to be taken into account in the context of this functional view. For 
example, contractual savings institutions like pension funds have to act more 
prudently in ensuring retirement income as compared to the ‘voluntary’ contribution 
set aside by individual investors for investment companies. In this respect, regulation 
and supervision should be geared towards the improvement and continued stability of 
both pension funds and insurance companies, with particular attention to the former 
due to the deficit funding of many pension funds in OECD countries. Greater 
regulatory and supervisory effort should also be focused on investment companies 
due to its strong causality on both the financial sector development and economic 
growth. This is because there is a relatively larger scope for the development of 
investment companies as compared to the already established contractual saving 
                                                           
34 There are three main justification for investment limits and these are generally applicable to 
developing countries whose financial sector are underdeveloped: (1)lack of expertise in fund 
management and in particular absence of adequate risk assessment models may lead to take excessive 
risks; (2)Fragile financial markets may put at risk the sustainability of institutional investors 
investments; and  (3) limiting the maximum risk that an institutional investor can take on alleviates the 
moral hazard problem created by government pension guarantees. 
35 It is important to avoid confusion between “prudent man” rules and “prudential” rules which 
encompass any rules (quantitative, prudent person, etc.) whose objectives are, in particular, the 
promotion of financial security of concerned operators.  
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institutions. Hence, adequate and prudent risk management techniques should be 
encouraged and implemented in balancing the trade-off between regulatory control 
and the innovativeness of investment companies. Particular attention should also be 
focused on preserving consumer protection in ensuring the further growth of 
investment companies. 
While it is necessary to minimize regulatory distortions that could affect the 
offer of similar products by two different institutions, it is also important to take a 
comprehensive view of the structure and range of other risks to which a given 
institution is exposed. It also should be noted that successful regulation and 
supervision depends importantly on recognizing the limits of what government can do 
to improve efficiency and on recognizing when government inaction is the best 
choice. Government regulatory and supervisory actions can do much to either mitigate 
or aggravate the dysfunctional aspects of financial markets. This is because, well 
intentioned government policies aimed at reducing the systemic risks of a crisis in the 
global financial market may have the unintended and perverse consequence of 
actually increasing the risk of such a crisis. 
This functional approach to both the empirical growth and financial sector 
issue combined with the regulation and supervision of these institutional investors has 
provided a neat and broad-based result and policy recommendation. Studies at the 
individual country level which take into consideration of country specific factors like 
cultural, historical, legal and developmental would add to the richness of our results 
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Table A1: Financial Institutions 
 
Institution Agents Functions 
 
Deposit Taking Institution - Banks 
- Thrifts 
- Credit unions 
 
Make loans and accept deposits 
Risk Pooling Institutions * - Insurance company  
(life & general – property and casualty 
in US, or known as non-life) 
 
 
Contractual Savings * - Pension Fund  
- Investment/Mutual Fund  
(open-end to close-end) [income, 
growth, tax-exempt, high-yield, 
sectoral, hedge and global funds] 
 
Provide contractual savings 
services in a fiduciary rather 
than a principle role. 
Market Markers 
 
- Security dealers (investment banks, 
stockbrokers, and other financial 
institutions that stand ready to buy or 
sell securities) 
 
Make primary (underwriting 
new securities and facilitating 
their distribution to individuals 
and institutional investors) and 
secondary markets (taking 
principal positions as buyers and 






- Finance companies 
- leasing companies 
Provide a highly specialized 






- Specialized securities brokers 
- Mortgage brokers 
- Management consultants 
- Investment advisors 
 
Provide services (on a fee-for-
service) in the form of advice 
brokering and so on. 
 
* Carmichael and Pomerleano (2002) define institutional investors collectively as risk pooling and 
contractual savings institutions. While illustrative, we define ‘contractual savings institutions’ as 
consisting of both pension funds and insurance companies. This definition is followed through out the 
study and is consistent with works by Catalan, Impavido and Musalem (2000), Impavido and Musalem 
(2000), Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2002a, 2002b, 2003). 
 
Source:  Carmichael, J. and Pomerleano, M. “The Development of Non-Bank Financial Institutions” 















Table A2: Quantitative Restrictions on Pension Fund Investment 
 






Loans Bank deposit Direct Limits on Foreign Investment 
Australia No limit  No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit 
Austria2 50 20 No limit No limit 10  50 
Belgium 65 (quoted) 
30 (unquoted) 
40* No limit 30 40* (mortgage) No limit 5 (foreign) 
65 (OECD equities) 
Investment in non-OECD equities is 
not permitted 
Canada No limit 25 No limit No limit No limit No limit  
Denmark 40 40*  40*   20 
Finland 50 (quoted) 
10 (unquoted) 
40 No limit No limit 70 (mortgage 
loans, including 
real estates and 
buildings 
10 (subordinated 
loans)   
 Maximum 5% of the assets may be 
altogether invested in assets in OECD 
countries other than EEA countries 
France 65 (quoted) 
0.5 (unquoted) 
0 No limit  10   
Germany2 30 (quoted) 
10 (unquoted) 
25 50 30 50 (mortgage) 
50 (other) 
50 30 (EU equity) 
25 (EU property) 
6 (non-EU equity) 
5 (non-EU bonds) 
Greece1        
Italy No limit No limit No limit 20 No limit 20 Debt and equity securities of OECD 
countries not traded in regulated 
markets are limited to 50% of funds 
assets 
Debt and equity securities of non-
OECD countries traded in regulated 
markets are limited to 5% 
Debt and equity securities of non-
OECD countries traded in regulated 
markets are prohibited 
Japan No limit  No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit 
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Korea 40 15     10 
Luxembourg No limit  No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit 10 (on securities issued by non-
resident) 
Mexico 0 0 35 0 0 250,000 in 
local currency 




Prohibited. Pension funds can invest up 
to 10% of their assets in foreign 
currency dominated securities issued by 
the federal government of the central 
bank (e.g. Brady Bonds) 
Netherlands No limit  No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit 
Norway 35 No limit 30 30 1 (unsecured loans) No limit No limit 
Portugal 50 45 60 
(corporate) 
30 25 (mortgage) 
5 (other) 
30 20 (overall limit) 
- 10 (non-OECD bonds) 
- 3 (non-OECD stocks) 
Spain No limit (quoted) 
10 (unquoted) 
No limit No limit No limit 10 (if no mortgage 
guarantee) 
15 None for OECD countries 
Sweden 60 No limit     5-10 (depending on the funds and the 
assets concerned) 
Switzerland       30 
Turkey1        
UK No limit  No limit No limit No limit No employer 
related loans 
No limit No limit 
US No limit  No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit 
 
* stands for joint limits 
(1) There are no pension funds in Greece and Turkey. 




Adapted from Davis and Steil (2001) and Blommestein and Funke (1998). 
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Table A3: Bank based vs. Market based systems: Comparative Advantages 
 
 
Traditionally, there are considered to be four main factors that divide borrowers from banks and 
markets finance :-  
 
(1) Economies of scale: owing to transactions costs, small investors and borrowers use banks, while 
wholesale users can access bond markets.  
(2) Information: banks have a comparative advantage in screening and monitoring borrowers to avoid 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard which arise in debt contracts – market finance is only 
available to those borrowers having a good reputation.  
(3) Control: banks are better able to influence the behaviour of borrowers while a loan is outstanding, 
and to seize assets or restructure in the case of default, than markets.  
(4) Commitment: banks can form long-term relationships with borrowers, which reduces information 
asymmetry and hence moral hazard.  
 
        Emerging direct evidence of comparative advantages of banks over other forms of finance include 
signalling effects of bank lending relationships on the cost of other forms of finance, as other providers 
of external finance appear to take existing lending relationships and the associated agreement on the 
part of the firm to be monitored as a positive signal about firm quality (James 1987; James and Wier 
1990). Fama (1985) and James (1987) show that borrowers and not depositors tend to bear the tax of 
reserve requirements in the United States. This suggests that borrowers obtain services from banks 
which are not obtainable elsewhere; otherwise they would shift to avoid the burden of the tax. 
Elliehausen and Wolken (1990) show the importance of bank lending relations to small firms and 
reliance of such firms on banks which are geographically close; see also Hannan (1991). This implies 
that imperfect substitutability is an important empirical phenomenon. Regarding the value of banking 
relationships, Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) found that borrowers from Continental Illinois 
bank had negative excess stock returns during its crisis and positive returns during the bank’s 
rehabilitation. The size of the excess returns varied with the importance of the relationship between the 
bank and the borrower. Petersen and Rajan (1994) similarly found positive effects of close and 
committed banking relationships on firms’ value. Meanwhile, Berger and Udell (1992) show that 
securitization has not changed the importance of banks as monitors of debt claims holding illiquid 
assets, partly because the loans which are securitized are often held by other banks rather than direct 
investors. These studies suggest that banks do have a clear comparative advantage over other sources 
of finance, for certain types of transaction. 
 



















Table A4: Panel GMM Difference Estimator with Institutional Investors, banks and various 
stock market indicators  
 ∆IINVEST t ∆Stock 
Indicators t 
∆DC t 
∆IINVEST t-1 0.486499 ***  0.220248 ***    0.0156126     
∆IINVEST t-2 0.174039 ***  0.0630463     0.0112126     
∆DC t-1 -0.154631      -0.0935778      0.791824 ***      
∆DC t-2 0.107334      0.446022 *      0.0627574     
∆MC t-1 -0.176406 **    0.567433 ***      -0.0206410     
∆MC t-2 -0.00805681     -0.134925 **     0.0500995 **     
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.994  0.128   0.150 
AR(1)  0.083  0.011   0.012  
AR(2)  0.182  0.641  0.243 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 0.485585 ***      0.351077 ***    0.00933171     
∆IINVEST t-2 0.152477 ***     0.124935     0.0111625     
∆DC t-1 -0.128822     0.393748      0.843602 ***      
∆DC t-2 0.140232      -0.387914      0.0568494     
∆ST t-1 -0.0614988     0.573249 ***     -0.0153956     
∆ST t-2 0.0166955     -0.223850 ***    0.0305346 **    
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.780  0.18   0.126 
AR(1)  0.076  0.031  0.018 
AR(2)  0.165  0.271  0.309 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 0.502966 ***      0.162624 **    0.0217838     
∆IINVEST t-2 0.128246 *     0.136020 **    0.0103925     
∆DC t-1 -0.0314756      0.504552      0.842833 ***     
∆DC t-2 0.0921571      -0.516853      0.0214923      
∆TR t-1 -0.00578375     0.228366 *     -0.00475749     
∆TR t-2 0.00372295     -0.184361*     0.00959278     
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.884  0.183  0.183 
AR(1)  0.086  0.010  0.012 
AR(2)  0.166  0.849  0.287 
Notes: 
1) The table presents linear GMM 1-step estimates of a four-variate panel VAR that employs two 
lags of the system variables. 
2) *, ** and *** denote significance of the individual coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively (p-value; the associated Chi-square statistic is not reported). 
3) Time dummies and intercept are included in the estimation but are not reported. 
4) The Sargan test (p-value) of the overidentiying restriction employs the null hypothesis that the 
instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 
5) For serial correlation, the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression 









Table A5: Panel GMM Difference Estimator with Gross Domestic Product, Institutional 
Investors, various financial sector indicators  
 ∆IINVEST t ∆GDP t ∆Financial 
Indicators t 
∆IINVEST t-1 0.486226 ***      0.00738824    0.0261012 *    
∆IINVEST t-2 0.124218     -0.00824032 *    0.0142098     
∆GDP t-1 -0.506344      0.675699 ***     0.749103 *     
∆GDPt-2 0.352997      0.0743662      -0.319610      
∆DC t-1 -0.0293386      -0.0831929 ***     0.855218 ***      
∆DC t-2 0.0465519      0.000897370     0.0739431      
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.963  0.179  0.157 
AR(1)  0.091  0.004   0.007 
AR(2)  0.155  0.499  0.200 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 0.483637 ***     0.0100667 **   0.223471 ***     
∆IINVEST t-2 0.167434 ***    -0.0142285 ***   0.0559016     
∆GDP t-1 -0.0160524      0.800707 ***     0.387640       
∆GDPt-2 -0.370416      -0.0257388      -1.15207 *      
∆MC t-1 -0.169962 *    0.0289430 **     0.549414 ***     
∆MC t-2 -0.00740649     -0.0152623 *    -0.156459 **    
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.999  0.133  0.118 
AR(1)  0.090  0.009   0.009  
AR(2)  0.193  0.317  0.617 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 0.479123 ***     0.00916560    0.307171 ***    
∆IINVEST t-2 0.147226 ***     -0.0131349 ***   0.106525     
∆GDP t-1 -0.194944      0.766912 ***     -3.36441 **       
∆GDPt-2 0.00483963      -0.00901598      1.85602       
∆VT t-1 -0.0604902     0.00904819 *   0.613151 ***     
∆VT t-2 0.0156261     -0.00191096    -0.170358 **    
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.974  0.160  0.141  
AR(1)  0.083  0.003   0.039  
AR(2)  0.167  0.728  0.504 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 0.472791 ***     0.00675778    0.104469     
∆IINVEST t-2 0.113535 *    -0.00933102 **   0.138916 ***    
∆GDP t-1 -0.557751      0.811002 ***     -2.55892 **      
∆GDPt-2 0.416298      -0.0673719      1.78654 **     
∆TR t-1 0.0235722     -0.00460169    0.278167 **      
∆TR t-2 0.0180965     0.00919259 **    -0.145025      
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.838  0.143   0.255 
AR(1)  0.094  0.003   0.012  
AR(2)  0.157  0.360  0.789 





Table A6: Panel GMM Difference Estimator with Gross Domestic Product, Institutional 
Investors, Banks and Stock Market Capitalization 
a) ∆IINVEST t ∆GDP t ∆DC t ∆MC t 
∆IINVEST t-1 0.47156 ***      0.0089944 *   0.0216263     0.198992 ***     
∆IINVEST t-2 0.170197 ***    -0.012479 **   0.0122401     0.0680039     
∆GDP t-1 -0.305006      0.748019 ***     0.496237      0.0871716      
∆GDP t-2 -0.185292      0.0468801      -0.121994      -0.972377 **     
∆DC t-1 -0.14439      -0.059247 **    0.837074 ***     -0.243419      
∆DC t-2 0.0458589      -0.005224     0.0931409     0.351536      
∆MC t-1 -0.184077 **    0.0239363 *     -0.0143181     0.551514 ***     
∆MC t-2 -0.002093     -0.014286    0.0419837 *     -0.137674 **    
Countries 23 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  1.000  0.965  0.928  0.521 
AR(1)  0.086  0.005  0.011  0.009  
AR(2)  0.189  0.332  0.205  0.539 
     
b) ∆IINVEST t ∆GDP t ∆DC t ∆ST t 
∆IINVEST t-1 0.474428 ***     0.0073893 0.0163824     0.313016***    
∆IINVEST t-2 0.143458 **      -0.01149 **    0.0166813     0.0737587     
∆GDP t-1 -0.677899      0.689041 ***     0.640113      -3.33770 **      
∆GDP t-2 0.165097      0.0881969      -0.260898      1.91610 *      
∆DC t-1 -0.045602      -0.071849 ***    0.832008 ***     0.338442      
∆DC t-2 0.0953073      -0.001171    0.0960896      -0.577401      
∆ST t-1 -0.060166 *    0.0071603 *   -0.016463     0.640779***      
∆ST t-2 0.0242193     -0.000961    0.0236675     -0.188198 **    
Countries 23 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.999  0.942  0.891  0.484 
AR(1)  0.080  0.002  0.012  0.030 
AR(2)  0.158  0.600  0.235  0.500 
     
c) ∆IINVEST t ∆GDP t ∆DC t ∆TR t 
∆IINVEST t-1 0.476734 ***     0.0049393 0.0226278      0.114438     
∆IINVEST t-2 0.112005     -0.008123 **   0.0134542     0.104058 *    
∆GDP t-1 -0.726028      0.729049 ***     0.670224      -2.46162 **      
∆GDP t-2 0.429067      0.0394459      -0.293613      1.67373 *     
∆DC t-1 0.0135768      -0.078018 *** 0.855030 ***     0.504520      
∆DC t-2 0.0360513      0.0083972     0.0686245      -0.671351      
∆TR t-1 0.0213150     -0.003450    -0.003752     0.297224 **      
∆TR t-2 0.0190310     0.0096172 *   0.0078612     -0.151844      
Countries 23 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.999  0.930  0.910  0.871 
AR(1)  0.093  0.003  0.009  0.007 
AR(2)  0.154  0.369  0.216  0.808 
     









Table A7: Panel GMM Difference Estimator with individual Institutional Investors, Banks and 
various Stock Market indicators  
 ∆IINVEST t 
(various) 
∆DC t ∆ Stock Market 
Indicators t 
∆IINVEST t-1 (Pen) 0.302430      -0.00566359     -0.0773148     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Pen) 0.136077 *    0.00146616     -0.0504838 *     
∆DC t-1 1.17209 ***     0.665879 ***     0.149222      
∆DC t-2 -1.03334 *     0.0418294     0.862908 ***      
∆MC t-1 -0.105295      0.0119003     0.574751 ***     
∆MC t-2 0.273343 ***    0.00671015     -0.134265 *    
Countries 18 18 18 
Observation 162 162 162 
Sargan Test  [0.848]  [0.630]  [0.746] 
AR(1)  [0.041]   [0.047]   [0.047]  
AR(2)  [0.060]  [0.297]  [0.492] 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Ins) 0.416080 **     -0.000385627    -0.178331 **    
∆IINVEST t-2 (Ins) 0.119600     0.000436185     -0.0238544     
∆DC t-1 0.0305914      0.813394 ***     -0.0403043      
∆DC t-2 0.0256785      0.0438156     0.478630 *     
∆MC t-1 0.101220     -0.0153757     0.619675 ***      
∆MC t-2 0.0913683     0.0487173 **    -0.108868 **     
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.962  0.139  0.139  
AR(1)  0.129  0.016   0.010  
AR(2)  0.226  0.248  0.575 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Invt) 0.548211 ***      -0.0449071 **     0.149251     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Invt) 0.156971 **     0.0196526     0.0670247     
∆DC t-1 -0.376444      0.834367 ***     -0.157298      
∆DC t-2 0.0465965      0.0358775     0.492057 *      
∆MC t-1 0.0220402      -0.00708153     0.621726 ***     
∆MC t-2 0.00427285     0.0409914 *     -0.0964923 *    
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.929  0.160  0.111 
AR(1)  0.085  0.020  0.008  
AR(2)  0.489  0.288  0.303 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Pen) 0.326969      -0.00837335     -0.224231 **      
∆IINVEST t-2 (Pen) 0.126505     -0.00150407     -0.0419912     
∆DC t-1 1.10537 **     0.720701 ***     1.01422      
∆DC t-2 -1.15338 **      0.0619401     -0.114129      
∆VT t-1 -0.0219516     -0.0121132     0.599496 ***      
∆VT t-2 0.115872 **     0.00599852     -0.145766      
Countries 18 18 18 
Observation 162   162   162   
Sargan Test  0.839  0.652  0.889 
AR(1)  0.050  0.045   0.045  
AR(2)  0.170  0.340  0.583 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Ins) 0.449999 **      0.00231623     -0.283696 **      
∆IINVEST t-2 (Ins) 0.108422     -0.00154012     -0.0849126     
∆DC t-1 -0.0184405      0.837906 ***      0.404744      
∆DC t-2 -0.0793823      0.0432468     -0.432144      
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∆VT t-1 0.0572623     -0.0152353     0.613683 ***      
∆VT t-2 -0.0133751     0.0293653 **    -0.201249 **     
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.894  0.173  0.123 
AR(1)  0.120  0.021   0.024  
AR(2)  0.232  0.312  0.256 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Invt) 0.514548 ***     -0.0445900 **     0.252819 **     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Invt) 0.166900 ***     0.0193332     0.0651855     
∆DC t-1 -0.306798      0.842170 ***      0.507699      
∆DC t-2 -0.0259847      0.0306509     -0.376695      
∆VT t-1 0.0560662     -0.0125484     0.686832 ***      
∆VT t-2 -0.0488733     0.0247736 **    -0.181440 **     
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.884  0.15]  0.174 
AR(1)  0.084  0.025   0.017  
AR(2)  0.492  0.354  0.388 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Pen) 0.338830 *     -0.0126150     -0.204034 **    
∆IINVEST t-2 (Pen) 0.0995139      -0.00549654     -0.0788746     
∆DC t-1 1.07107 **      0.727952 ***      0.839843      
∆DC t-2 -1.11751 *     0.0751627     -0.532509      
∆TR t-1 0.00386571     -0.0179083      0.222045 *     
∆TR t-2 -0.0336986     0.000310864     -0.184444      
Countries 18 18 18 
Observation 162 162 162 
Sargan Test  0.777  0.709  0.973 
AR(1)  0.057  0.042   0.021  
AR(2)  0.179  0.340  0.507 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Ins) 0.460568 **      0.000961686     -0.229432 **    
∆IINVEST t-2 (Ins) 0.0947174     -0.00329768     -0.155726 **     
∆DC t-1 0.0861220      0.839004 ***      0.557486      
∆DC t-2 -0.0348847     0.0101825     -0.546827      
∆TR t-1 0.0339892     -0.00117175     0.198516 *      
∆TR t-2 -0.0541120     0.0118397     -0.194011 *      
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.882  0.202  0.146 
AR(1)  0.108  0.014   0.013  
AR(2)  0.236  0.295  0.732 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Invt) 0.534955 ***      -0.0476785 **     0.169429 ***     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Invt) 0.158296 ***     0.0224262 *    -0.00295808     
∆DC t-1 -0.304569      0.858880 ***     0.613260      
∆DC t-2 -0.00989154      0.00401533     -0.621014      
∆TR t-1 0.0564119     -0.00334514     0.315727 ***      
∆TR t-2 -0.0564762     0.00958807    -0.140174      
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.942  0.174  0.325 
AR(1)  0.086  0.018   0.005  
AR(2)  0.479  0.343  0.974 
Notes: See notes in Table A4. 
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Table A8: Panel GMM Difference Estimator with Gross Domestic Product, individual 
Institutional Investors, and various financial market indicators  
 ∆IINVEST t ∆GDP t ∆ Financial 
Indicators t 
∆IINVEST t-1 (Pen) 0.335618 *      -0.0138914 **    -0.0239265     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Pen) 0.0999235     0.0114083 ***    -0.00935729     
∆GDP t-1 0.00253969       0.830676 ***      0.508187     
∆GDP t-2 -0.823418      -0.0105614      -0.317393      
∆DC t-1 1.08990 **     -0.0730535 **    0.752901 ***      
∆DC t-2 -1.24062 **      0.0402318 *    0.104885      
Countries 18 18 18 
Observation 162 162 162 
Sargan Test  0.870  0.823  0.727 
AR(1)  0.050   0.006   0.029  
AR(2)  0.171  0.737  0.261 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Ins) 0.398607 **      0.00797845    -0.00391335     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Ins) 0.0789717     0.00619535    -0.0124602     
∆GDP t-1 0.268009      0.753625 ***      0.621688      
∆GDP t-2 -0.497924      0.0257443      -0.310508      
∆DC t-1 0.122160      -0.0749905 ***    0.862253 ***      
∆DC t-2 0.0132559      0.0129181     0.0557888      
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.941  0.123  0.189 
AR(1)  0.111  0.002   0.008  
AR(2)  0.225 
 
 0.668  0.211 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Invt) 0.378279 **      0.00490381    -0.0207508     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Invt) 0.217956 ***    0.00664111 *   0.00366839     
∆GDP t-1 0.570695      0.754592 ***      0.589355      
∆GDP t-2 -1.14308 **     0.0365736      -0.308601      
∆DC t-1 -0.207489      -0.0676531**    0.854972 ***     
∆DC t-2 -0.0802855      0.0227353     0.0385201      
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.990  0.126   0.163 
AR(1)  0.058  0.002   0.011 
AR(2)  0.604  0.539  0.217 
 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Pen) 0.237858      -0.00307963    -0.0333760     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Pen) 0.138823     0.0108415 ***    -0.0363963     
∆GDP t-1 -2.19960 **      0.998860 ***    -0.968264       
∆GDP t-2 1.76091 ***     -0.144083 **     -0.0880716      
∆MC t-1 -0.146580     0.0361196 ***     0.583487 ***      
∆MC t-2 0.345670 ***      -0.0238007 ***    -0.172257 **    
Countries 18 18 18 
Observation 162 162 162 
Sargan Test  0.809  0.616  0.729 
AR(1)  0.042   0.008   0.046 
AR(2)  0.152  0.349  0.464  
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Ins) 0.415796 **      0.00275121    -0.152287 **     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Ins) 0.129708     0.00794160    -0.0234407     
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∆GDP t-1 -0.661506      0.787490 ***     -0.00626416       
∆GDP t-2 0.705440      -0.0155373      -0.993320      
∆MC t-1 0.0943472     0.0291543 **     0.597483 ***     
∆MC t-2 0.0974263     -0.0144810    -0.120494 *    
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.982  0.154  0.166  
AR(1)  0.123  0.007   0.008  
AR(2)  0.222  0.319  0.574 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Invt) 0.534493 ***      -0.00322575    0.105796     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Invt) 0.171527 **     0.0122351 ***    0.0704058     
∆GDP t-1 -0.309829      0.797163 ***      -0.558891      
∆GDP t-2 -0.941648      -0.0141380      -0.427900      
∆MC t-1 -0.000489495      0.0251621 *     0.561824 ***      
∆MC t-2 -0.000965383     -0.0157265 *    -0.119965 **     
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.894  0.198  0.134  
AR(1)  0.079  0.008   0.006  
AR(2)  0.472  0.319  0.443 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Pen) 0.240259      -0.0112881 **    -0.164436      
∆IINVEST t-2 (Pen) 0.0891560      0.0132769 ***   0.0139139     
∆GDP t-1 -0.582056      0.890735 ***      -4.79085 ***      
∆GDP t-2 -0.107218      -0.0484198      3.27103 ***       
∆VT t-1 -0.0850962     0.00476717    0.632885 ***      
∆VT t-2 0.119476 *    0.00215457    -0.157849      
Countries 18 18 18 
Observation 162 162 162 
Sargan Test  0.849  0.724  0.816 
AR(1)  0.047  0.009   0.043  
AR(2)  0.162  0.865  0.598 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Ins) 0.451618 **      0.00389546    -0.249090 *      
∆IINVEST t-2 (Ins) 0.119184     0.00915522 *    -0.0147393     
∆GDP t-1 -0.599551      0.785955 ***      -3.47154 *       
∆GDP t-2 0.243577      -0.00555249      1.88470       
∆VT t-1 0.0547912     0.0100203 **    0.662557 ***     
∆VT t-2 -0.00516973     -0.00173954    -0.150988 *     
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.986  0.123  0.120  
AR(1)  0.117  0.003   0.027 
AR(2)  0.231  0.756  0.401 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Invt) 0.503745 ***      0.00349464    0.168275 *     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Invt) 0.174658 **     0.00994012 ***   0.115286     
∆GDP t-1 0.104904      0.792583 ***      -4.94639 ***       
∆GDP t-2 -1.20425 **     -0.00187687      3.29749 ***     
∆VT t-1 0.0231284     0.00538697    0.685254 ***     
∆VT t-2 -0.0474875     -0.00201647    -0.138098     
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.840  0.176  0.153 
AR(1)  0.078  0.003   0.028  
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AR(2)  0.471  0.562  0.936 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Pen) 0.252433      -0.0145089 *    -0.207812 **     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Pen) 0.0610718      0.00926310 ***    -0.0627197     
∆GDP t-1 0.233411      0.953319 ***    -2.96686 **      
∆GDP t-2 -0.600432      -0.135050 *    2.08419 **      
∆TR t-1 -0.0367556     -0.0119843     0.241284 *     
∆TR t-2 -0.0349231     0.0127402 **    -0.209153      
Countries 18 18 18 
Observation 162 162 162 
Sargan Test  0.662  0.665  0.920 
AR(1)  0.060  0.003   0.025  
AR(2)  0.173  0.238  0.578 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Ins) 0.452864 **     0.00583971    -0.135289 *     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Ins) 0.0829107      0.00569076    -0.102261 **     
∆GDP t-1 0.229044      0.838648 ***      -2.26476 **       
∆GDP t-2 -0.388347      -0.0759587      1.40522 *     
∆TR t-1 0.00746136     -0.00401923    0.279230 **      
∆TR t-2 -0.0617485     0.00992332 **    -0.140517      
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.856  0.117   0.116 
AR(1)  0.114  0.003   0.010  
AR(2)  0.229  0.351  0.877 
    
∆IINVEST t-1 (Invt) 0.514800 ***     0.00670036    0.0986871 *     
∆IINVEST t-2 (Invt) 0.169017 **    0.00930042 **    0.0314795     
∆GDP t-1 0.213734      0.789115 ***      -3.25993 ***     
∆GDP t-2 -1.16492 ***      -0.0165415      2.31099 ***      
∆TR t-1 0.00160552     -0.00410171    0.320243 ***     
∆TR t-2 -0.0728888     0.00870382 *    -0.124059      
Countries 23 23 23 
Observation 207 207 207 
Sargan Test  0.874  0.121  0.318 
AR(1)  0.077  0.005   0.010 
AR(2)  0.477  0.216  0.680 
Notes: See notes in Table A4. 
 
 
 
